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INSURING NATURE
CAROLYN KOUSKY† & SARAH E. LIGHT††
ABSTRACT
Scholars and policymakers have argued that insurance can shape
behavior in ways that mitigate climate risks, such as by providing
financial incentives to property owners to safeguard their property
from increasingly intense hurricanes or from the risk of sea-level rise.
But natural ecosystems like coral reefs, mangroves, and forest
ecosystems can themselves protect property from these increased
climate risks. This Article turns the climate governance literature on its
head, examining the circumstances under which it is possible to insure
nature itself in order to preserve these critical ecosystem services in the
face of a changing climate.
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INTRODUCTION
The natural world and its ecosystems are valuable both for
intrinsic reasons and for their instrumental value to people.1 These
instrumental benefits that people derive from nature are often referred
to as ecosystem services. However, these benefits are rapidly declining.
For instance, a recent United Nations report compiled by 145 expert
authors from 50 countries stresses that natural resources are declining
globally at rates never before matched in human history and the rate
of species extinction is increasing.2 This degradation arises as a result

1. On the idea that nature has instrumental value for the services it provides to people, see
generally NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen
C. Daily ed., 1997) [hereinafter NATURE’S SERVICES] (discussing the value to humans of natural
ecosystems in different contexts); GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE 108 (David
Lowenthal ed., 1864) (“Earth, water, the ducts and fluids of vegetable and of animal life, the very
air we breathe, are peopled by minute organisms which perform most important functions in both
the living and the inanimate kingdoms of nature.”); Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy,
Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE’S SERVICES,
supra, at 24–27 (discussing different ethical approaches to valuing ecosystem services grounded
in utilitarianism and intrinsic rights). On the idea that nature has intrinsic value, see generally
Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49 (2018) (discussing
the view that the environment, or a feature of the environment like a river, can have legal status
as a person). A recognition of the importance of ecosystem services dates back to Plato and
possibly earlier. Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary
History, in NATURE’S SERVICES, supra, at 11.
2. SANDRA DIAZ ET AL., SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE GLOBAL ASSESSMENT
REPORT ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 3 (advanced
unedited ed. 2019).

KOUSKY & LIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

INSURING NATURE

10/23/2019 1:37 PM

325

of multiple causes, including pollution, land conversion for human use,
and climate change.3 This Article explores the circumstances under
which insurance—a risk management tool not typically used in
conservation—can actually help conserve and restore ecosystems and
the ecosystem services on which society depends.
Ecosystems provide people with market goods, such as timber and
food, as well as goods and services that do not have an easily
ascertainable market value. These services include water and air
purification, habitat provision for diverse species, crop pollination,
climate regulation, shoreline protection, flood mitigation, pest control,
renewal of soil fertility, and waste decomposition.4 Ecosystems also
provide space for activities like outdoor recreation, as well as supply
other aesthetic or “non-use” values, such as the pleasure people derive
from just knowing that certain species (such as polar bears) or
ecosystems (such as the Grand Canyon or the Great Barrier Reef)
exist.5
This Article focuses on an important class of ecosystem services
that help minimize the risks of natural-disaster events to human
populations6—services that are becoming even more important as the
climate warms. For example, coastal mangroves and coral reefs act as
natural barriers that can protect coastal properties from increasingly
frequent storm surges.7 Wetlands reduce growing flood risks to nearby
property triggered by increasingly heavy precipitation events,8 and
3. Id.
4. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES,
supra note 1, at 3–4; James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 892
(1997) [hereinafter Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services] (discussing different types of ecosystem
services).
5. See J.B. Ruhl, Valuing Nature’s Services: The Future of Environmental Law?, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 359, 360 (1998) [hereinafter Ruhl, Valuing Nature’s Services] (“The most
difficult aspect of this problem . . . is that we can take ecosystem services for granted and still reap
their benefits . . . .”); Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 892–93. For further
discussion of non-use value and other aspects of valuation, see infra Part I.B.
6. Carolyn Kousky, Using Natural Capital to Reduce Disaster Risk, 2 J. NAT. RESOURCES
POL’Y RES. 343, 343 (2010) [hereinafter Kousky, Using Natural Capital]. On investing in natural
resources as a tool of environmental governance, see generally MARK R. TERCEK & JONATHAN
S. ADAMS, NATURE’S FORTUNE: HOW BUSINESS AND SOCIETY THRIVE BY INVESTING IN
NATURE (2013).
7. See Katie K. Arkema et al., Coastal Habitats Shield People and Property from Sea-Level
Rise and Storms, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913 (2013) (empirically demonstrating the role
that natural coastal habitats—including mangroves, coral reefs, marsh, oyster reefs, dunes,
seagrass beds, kelp forests, and other vegetation—play in protecting shorelines).
8. For two examples, see Iman Mallakpour & Gabriele Villarini, The Changing Nature of
Flooding Across the Central United States, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 250, 250–54 (2015) and
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upland vegetation decreases the risk of landslides.9 Wetlands can also
store floodwaters and dunes can buffer storm surges.10 More broadly,
ecosystems can remove significant amounts of carbon from the
atmosphere, lessening the impact of climate change on a global scale.11
Ecosystem services, while valuable, are what economists refer to
as “public goods.”12 This means that it is not possible to exclude anyone
from enjoying their benefits—they are provided to all—and one person
enjoying them does not diminish their value for others. Because private
entities cannot capture the full benefits of public goods, they tend to be
underprovided in the market. This means there are fewer ecosystem
services than would be economically optimal.13 Indeed, one recent
study concluded that global efforts to promote “natural climate
solutions”—investment in the ecosystem services that benefit the
climate—have received less than 1 percent of global public and private
financing,14 notwithstanding their potential to mitigate more than onethird of global greenhouse gas emissions through 2030.15
Andreas F. Prein et al., Increased Rainfall Volume from Future Convective Storms in the US, 7
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 880, 880–84 (2017).
9. THE ROLE OF ECOSYSTEMS IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 10 (Fabrice G. Renaud,
Karen Sudmeier-Rieux & Marisol Estrella eds., United Nations University Press 2013); Robert
Costanza et al., The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane Protection, 37 AMBIO 241, 241
(2008); Kousky, Using Natural Capital, supra note 6, at 343 (discussing examples of natural capital
mitigating disaster risk, including wetlands mitigating flood risk in a watershed, revegetation
reducing the risk of landslides, and mangrove forests protecting the coastline from storm surges).
10. See generally Kousky, Using Natural Capital, supra note 6, at 343 (discussing wetlands
and dunes as critical ecosystem services).
11. Joseph E. Fargione et al., Natural Climate Solutions for the United States, 4 SCI.
ADVANCES 1, 2 (2018) (concluding that improved land-management techniques such as
reforestation, fire management, avoided grassland conversion, the use of cover crops, and tidal
wetland restoration, among others, can remove carbon dioxide annually totaling approximately
21 percent of 2016 emissions).
12. On the idea that ecosystem services are “public goods,” see Robert Costanza et al.,
Changes in the Global Value of Ecosystem Services, 26 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 152, 154 (2014)
(noting that ecosystem services tend to be public goods); A. P. Kinzig et al., Paying for Ecosystem
Services—Promise and Peril, 334 SCIENCE 603, 603–04 (2011) (discussing “mechanisms for
motivating people to provide scarce [ecosystem services] that are public goods”); Christopher L.
Lant, J.B. Ruhl & Steven E. Kraft, The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services, 58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 971
(2009); and James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 875–76, 876 n.17 (2005) [hereinafter Salzman, Creating Markets] (discussing
literature on ecosystems as public goods).
13. Salzman, Creating Markets, supra note 12, at 875–76.
14. Fargione et al., supra note 11, at 4 (citing BARBARA K. BUCHNER ET AL., GLOBAL
LANDSCAPE OF CLIMATE FINANCE 2015 (2015), http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6W6Z-3BSN]).
15. Bronson W. Griscom et al., Natural Climate Solutions, 114 PNAS 11645, 11645 (2017).
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In addition to this public goods problem, the ecosystems that
protect people from natural disasters, such as storms and wildfires, can
themselves be damaged by these very same events,16 decreasing the
range of ecosystem services they can provide. Thus, there is the
potential for a negative feedback loop. For instance, coral reefs and
coastal mangroves protect coastlines against storm surges, which are
becoming even more common as the oceans warm.17 But these very
same storms and hurricanes can damage coral reefs and coastal
mangroves, thus lessening the protective services they provide to
people and coastal properties.18 This same cycle can play out in other
ecosystems, as well.19 Existing legal tools are typically inadequate to
ensure that these ecosystems will be restored quickly if damaged. This
inadequacy is magnified when such damage is caused by extreme
weather events, rather than by persons (either natural persons or
artificial persons like corporations) who can be sued as defendants ex
post or who must obtain permits before causing harm ex ante.20

16. See Arkema et al., supra note 7, at 913 (noting projected increase in coastal flooding by
mid-century); Thomas R. Knutson et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change, 3 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 157, 160–61 (2010) (discussing projected increases in hurricane intensity); Loren
McClenachan et al., Ghost Reefs: Nautical Charts Document Large Spatial Scale of Coral Reef
Loss over 240 Years, 3 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2017) (noting that both human impact through
agriculture and deforestation, as well as hurricanes and sea-level rise, have contributed to the loss
of reef-building corals); Seung-Ki Min et al., Human Contribution to More-Intense Precipitation
Extremes, 470 NATURE 378, 378–80 (2011) (discussing the increasing intensity of rainfall events).
To call such disasters “natural” should not obscure the scientific consensus that human action is
responsible for global climate change. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE,
CLIMATE
CHANGE
2014
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
v,
2
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S5JT-58HP] (“[H]uman influence on the climate system is clear and growing.”). However, the
role of humans in causing such disasters is more indirect than in other cases, such as through the
flow of polluted runoff directly into a wetland.
17. McClenachan et al., supra note 16, at 1 (noting that loss of oysters, mangroves, and coral
can reduce storm protection).
18. See generally T.P. Scoffin, The Geological Effects of Hurricanes on Coral Reefs and the
Interpretation of Storm Deposits, 12 CORAL REEFS 203 (1993) (observing that the “violence of
the storm relative to normal fair-weather conditions influences the extent of damage” and that
other factors including the time before the next storm influence the chance of a reef’s recovery or
preservation).
19. For example, storms can erode beaches and dunes, making the land behind them more
vulnerable to future storms. On the value of coastal habitats in providing storm protection, see
Arkema et al., supra note 7, at 913–18.
20. See infra Part I.C. Existing legal tools that seek to prevent harm to ecosystem services
include land acquisition and market-leveraging solutions like payments for ecosystem services, in
addition to permit systems such as the Clean Water Act’s § 404 wetlands program. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (2018) (describing the permitting process for dredged or fill material). Also illustrative are
prescriptive rules like the Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on the “take” of endangered
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Practitioners and legislators are growing more interested,
however, in whether insurance can help with both problems: increasing
the provision of an underprovided public good and also restoring it
quickly following a disaster. For example, in 2018, the governor of
California signed Senate Bill 30 into law, which directs the state
insurance commissioner to “identify, assess, and recommend risk
transfer market mechanisms that promote investment in natural
infrastructure.”21 This law followed quickly on the heels of the only
current example of insuring nature itself: the creation in 2018 of a
Coastal Zone Management Trust, funded in part through local tourism
taxes, that partners a local hotel owners association with the Mexican
state government of Quintana Roo, The Nature Conservancy, and a
local marine park that manages the coral reef. 22 In mid-2019, the Trust
purchased an insurance policy that will provide funds to quickly restore
the coral reef if damaged in a hurricane.23 The innovation is that the
insurance covers damage to the reef rather than damage to the private
property on the coastline. In other words, the policy insures nature
itself.
Yet, despite the recent enthusiasm for broader use of insurance in
conservation and restoration of ecosystems, very little academic work
has been done to examine exactly how this would work, whether it
would work, whether it could scale effectively around the world, and
when it would be preferable to other approaches. This Article begins
to address these questions.

species by any person, and the prohibition on adverse modification of critical habitat by federal
agencies either through their direct actions or as a result of their licensing, permitting, or funding
of private actions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2018) (prohibiting the “take” of endangered species by
“any person”); id. § 1532(19) (defining “take”); id. § 1536(a)(2) (governing federal agencies).
Governance tools that seek to restore damaged ecosystem services include natural resource
damages provisions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA,” also known as “Superfund”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018), and the
Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761.
21. S.B 30, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 2(a) (Cal. 2018) (codified at CAL. INS. CODE
§ 12922.5).
22. See infra Part III.C.1; see also Mark Tercek, Business to the Rescue: Insurance for Reef
Restoration, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2018, 6:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktercek/
2018/03/08/business-to-the-rescue-insurance-for-reef-restoration/#84c63a23e0c1 [https://
perma.cc/H7BE-88DE]; Insuring Nature To Ensure a Resilient Future, NATURE CONSERVANCY
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nature.org/en-us/what-we-do/our-insights/perspectives/insuringnature-to-ensure-a-resilient-future [https://perma.cc/YGD4-DLUK].
23. Gloria Gonzalez, Parametric Insurance Policy to Cover Mexico Coral Reef, BUS. INS.
(June 7, 2019), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190607/NEWS06/912328933/
Parametric-insurance-policy-to-cover-Mexico-coral-reef [https://perma.cc/HR64-49KT].
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This investigation begins in Part I with a brief primer on ecosystem
services. This Part defines ecosystem services and highlights the
challenges in valuation and in their status as public goods that can lead
to an underinvestment in their protection. It discusses other
governance tools used to protect ecosystem services and notes some
drawbacks particular to these other methods, including their failure to
focus on risk management.
Part II then turns to an overview of insurance and how it ordinarily
operates, focusing specifically on property insurance and disasters.
This Part explains the function of risk transfer, two types of insurance
(indemnity and parametric), and when and why governments provide
insurance. Much of the legal scholarship regarding the relationship
between insurance and climate change has focused on the capacity of
insurance to influence the behavior of private actors in ways that
promote climate mitigation or adaptation on their private property.24
This Article builds upon and extends beyond this existing literature.
The heart of the Article is presented in Parts III and IV. Part III
takes a deep dive into the details of insurance at work in the context of
ecosystems. After exploring how insurance can protect ecosystems in
two primary ways, it offers several concrete examples of insurance
products that are currently being applied (or considered) to protect
and restore ecosystem services. These include the collaboration in

24. See, e.g., Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance
Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1585 (2008) (examining how the insurance industry’s products
can influence private actors’ responses to climate change); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O.
Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability
Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1836–39 (2007) (offering suggestions to insurers to mitigate
climate damages by providing rate credits and other incentives while focusing on insuring
directors and officers); Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance,
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 293, 293–94 (2002) (explaining that the article “aims to show
how insurance can facilitate environmental care and compensation, and some advantages that
may accrue from mandating insurance in relation to certain environmental risks”); Christina
Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance RiskManagement Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 252
(2007) (“The most widely discussed insurance-related consequences of climate change are the
impacts of property damage from extreme weather events.”); Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio:
“Insuring” Against Global Warming, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 445, 474 (1992) (discussing the role of
insurance in the climate context). These articles focus on the financial incentives that insurance
can have on private behavior of policyholders through rebates or premium reductions for climateresilience or mitigation activities, how these incentives influence individuals and firms to purchase
insurance products, and the incentives that insurance firms have to provide such products, in light
of the fact that they are paying increasing amounts for insured losses. Hecht, supra, at 1594. They
do not focus on insuring nature itself.
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Mexico mentioned briefly above and a proposal to insure forests after
wildfires, among a few others.
Part IV then shifts from the analytic and descriptive to the
normative. It evaluates if and when insurance can be a valuable
instrument to promote ecosystem restoration and conservation. To do
so, this Part examines how different forms of insurance fare when
evaluated along normative criteria including efficiency, environmental
justice, accountability, and transparency, among others.25 This Part
concludes that insurance can be a uniquely effective tool for conserving
or funding the restoration of ecosystems, at least in some instances.
Insurance promotes certain normative values such as accountability,
transparency, and expressive content. However, it is not without its
drawbacks. We highlight the specific conditions under which insurance
can be a useful conservation and restoration tool. The Article
concludes by noting that insurance is an important policy tool in certain
circumstances for protecting and restoring vital and increasingly
threatened ecosystem services.
I. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
This Part offers a basic primer on ecosystem services. It explains
what ecosystem services are, the challenges in valuing them, and how
they have been addressed in environmental governance to date. An
understanding of these services is necessary to consider how insurance
mechanisms may work to protect or restore their provision, which we
take up in Parts II and III.
A. What are Ecosystem Services?
“An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and
microorganism communities and the nonliving environment
interacting as a functional unit.”26 Ecosystem services are both the
direct and indirect benefits that an ecosystem provides to human wellbeing.27 These include crop pollination, habitat provision, air and water

25. Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 53–71 (2015) (offering these normative values as
benchmarks for evaluating public and private instruments to address environmental challenges).
26. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING
(José
Sarukhán
et
al.
eds.,
2005),
https://www.millenniumassessment.org/
documents/document.356.aspx.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XHR-4NQJ].
27. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services, in NATURE’S SERVICES,
supra note 1, at 3–4.
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purification, pest control, renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation,
shoreline protection, flood mitigation, and waste decomposition,
among other services.28
The United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment divides
ecosystem services into four categories: provisioning services
(providing goods for human consumption like fish or timber);
regulatory services (regulating the environment for human benefit such
as by generating oxygen in the atmosphere or fixing nitrogen in the
soil); cultural services (providing recreational and aesthetic
enjoyment); and supporting services (regulating the land for the benefit
of nonhuman actors like bees or birds but also indirectly benefitting
humans through crop pollination or seed dispersal).29 Other than
provisioning services, which encompass goods like timber or fish that
can be bought and sold in markets, the remaining forms of ecosystem
services are “indirect non-market uses, for while they provide clear
benefits to humans they are neither directly ‘consumed’ nor exchanged
in markets.”30
In the climate context, certain ecosystem services are especially
important. For example, coastal forests like mangroves, coral reefs,
oyster reefs, dunes, and coastal vegetation like seagrass beds and kelp
forests protect coastlines from storm surges and sea-level rise, reducing
the impacts of such risks in the United States by as much as 50
percent.31 The loss of such ecosystem services along the coastline
would, therefore, have significant consequences, particularly for
vulnerable populations:

28. Id.; Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 892–93.
29. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services & Natural Capital: Reconceiving
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 465 (2008) (citing MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 26). The U.N. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was
initiated in 2001 to “assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and the
scientific basis for action needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of those systems
and their contribution to human well-being.” Overview of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT (2005), https://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/
About.html#1 [https://perma.cc/V8JZ-TRVK]. More than 1360 experts worldwide participated in
the Assessment. Id.
30. Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 893. Ecosystems and the services
they provide can likewise exist at different scales. Some ecosystems such as wetlands may have
local or regional impacts, while others, like the climate, are global in nature. The scale of the
ecosystem of course has an impact not only on how it is valued, but also on how it might be
governed.
31. Arkema et al., supra note 7, at 914 & fig. 1 (“Coastal habitats reduce by approximately
50% the proportion of people and property along the US coastline that are most exposed to
storms and sea-level rise.”).
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Habitat loss would double the extent of coastline highly exposed to
storms and sea-level rise . . . making an additional 1.4 million people
now living within 1 km of the coast vulnerable. The number of poor
families, elderly people and total property value highly exposed to
hazards would also double if protective habitats were lost.32

Some communities are beginning to actively try and preserve
ecosystems that bring value to residents. In one of the best-known
efforts to protect ecosystem services, beginning in the late 1990s, New
York City chose to protect the quality of its drinking-water supply by
purchasing conservation land in the Catskills River Basin.33 The cost of
protecting land, which was also done in conjunction with a number of
programs to promote practices that improved water quality, was
financed through the issuance of environmental bonds for
approximately $600 million. This was far lower than the cost of using
an engineered solution—the construction of a $4–6 billion waterfiltration plant.34 However, it is important to recognize that creating
resilience through the protection and restoration of ecosystem services
may go hand-in-hand with engineered solutions, also known as “grey”
infrastructure, rather than replacing such engineered solutions
entirely.35
B. How are Ecosystem Services Valued?
One of the biggest challenges for policymakers who seek to
protect or restore ecosystem services is the fact that most of them are
nonmarket goods and services. As such, there is no obvious price for
them and thus no financial incentive to protect ecosystems from
degradation in the first place, or restore them once they have been
harmed.36 If policymakers cannot value ecosystem services, they may
not be able to make rational judgments about the appropriate amount
of resources to devote to protecting them. Nor can they
straightforwardly determine the best regulatory tool, method of

32. Id. at 914–15 (citation omitted) (noting variation in impacts to coastal ecosystems and
habitat loss across the U.S. coastline, as well as valuation in coastal property values).
33. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE WATER
SUPPLY: ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY STRATEGY 5 (2000).
34. Kousky, Using Natural Capital, supra note 6, at 351 (citing a $4–6 billion cost estimate).
35. Arkema et al., supra note 7, at 916 (noting that after hurricanes affected New York City
and Louisiana, each jurisdiction sought to incorporate ecosystem-based strategies alongside
engineering solutions to address sea-level rise and storm surges).
36. This difficulty in valuation compounds the problem of underinvestment as a result of the
fact that many ecosystem services are public goods. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
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private governance, or hybrid public–private approach to ensure their
continued existence.
This problem has spurred the development of a host of methods
for estimating the economic values of ecosystem services.37 That said,
to be done well, these methods are often time and resource intensive
and require significant expertise. One benefit of using insurance as a
tool for ecosystem-service provision is that it usually does not require
economic estimates of the full “willingness-to-pay” of all beneficiaries.
Instead, it can rely on much easier to obtain estimates: the costs of
providing the service or restoring a damaged ecosystem.38 Valuation
studies can still play an important role, however, in identifying
insurable value, quantifying stakeholder benefits from ecosystems, and
generally stimulating the use of insurance.
Economists have developed a framework of the total economic
value of ecosystem services to incorporate all of the benefits provided
by a particular service. This divides total value into a use value
component—which is the value derived from the direct use of the
service by people—and a non-use value component—which is the value
derived from the existence of the service without human consumption
or use.39 Use values are further broken down into direct values and
indirect values.40 Direct values are those derived from actual
consumption or use of the ecosystem, such as clean water, food, or even
recreation, and are typically more easily measured using market
prices.41 Indirect values are benefits that the ecosystem provides

37. See David Pearce, An Intellectual History of Environmental Economics, 27 ANN. REV.
ENERGY & ENV’T 57, 57–61 (2002) (discussing the origins and development of environmental
economics). See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES:
TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (2005) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES] (discussing methods for valuing the goods and
services that ecosystems provide to human societies).
38. The relationship between insurance and valuation is more complex, as noted below. In
the parametric insurance context, where recovery is tied to a specific triggering event, there is no
need to engage in valuation of the actual damage. However, in creating such a policy, there is a
need for the insurer to value the ecosystem services to the extent necessary to determine an
appropriate payout in the event that the trigger requires payment under a policy. See infra Part
III.
39. For a broad discussion of the total economic value framework, see generally STEFANO
PAGIOLA, KONRAD VON RITTER & JOSHUA BISHOP, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION (2004).
40. Edward B. Barbier et al., The Value of Estuarine and Coastal Ecosystem Services, 81
ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 169, 173 (2011).
41. Id.
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beyond mere use of the ecosystem itself.42 For example, while a
mangrove forest directly contributes to fisheries or buffers against
storm surge, it also indirectly benefits people by sequestering carbon,
for example.43 Non-use values are even more intangible and abstract,
including, for example, the value of preserving an ecosystem as part of
a community’s cultural heritage, or the value that people derive simply
from knowing that a particular species continues to exist.44
Various economic methods can be used to estimate the value of
nonmarket goods and services like those described above.45 These
methods are based on the fundamental assumption that individual
preferences define economic value.46 These preferences are measured
in terms of the beneficiaries’ willingness-to-pay for the service, or the
maximum dollar amount they would pay for a well-defined additional
increment in the ecosystem service.47 These calculations are thus
inherently anthropocentric—that is, they are based exclusively on the
benefits that people derive from ecosystems.48
Willingness-to-pay can be estimated in a number of ways, which
are often grouped into two broad approaches: (1) revealed preference
and (2) stated preference methods.49 These are each discussed in turn.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Taylor H. Ricketts, Gretchen C. Daily, Paul R. Ehrlich & Charles D. Michener,
Economic Value of Tropical Forest to Coffee Production, 101 PNAS 12579, 12579–82 (2004)
(estimating the value of tropical forests in supplying pollination services to agriculture).
44. See generally Raymond J. Kopp, Why Existence Value Should Be Used in Cost–Benefit
Analysis, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 123 (1992).
45. See Gretchen C. Daily et al., The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value, 289 SCIENCE
395, 395–96 (2000).
46. For a discussion of the theory of revealed preference and its underlying assumptions, see
generally Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241 (1973).
47. For a detailed treatment of willingness-to-pay, as well as its relationship to another
metric, willingness-to-accept, see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES, supra note 37.
48. The anthropocentric nature of such valuation methods has therefore been the subject of
criticism:
[C]ost-benefit analysis is typically premised on a liberal conception in which only
humans—and more specifically, only presently living individual humans—are capable
of holding interests. For that reason, the value of nonhuman life-forms is acknowledged
only to the extent that identifiable human individuals value those life-forms, generally
through revealed preference or contingent valuation studies. . . . Neither the individuals
who are subjected to preference-elicitation studies nor the economists who interpret
the results are necessarily well versed in the underlying scientific questions regarding
the role, resilience, and replaceability of natural resources and ecosystem services.
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 180–81 (2010).
49. For a detailed treatment, see generally A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS (2003).
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We then discuss a method, called benefits transfer, which imports
valuation estimates from other contexts when original valuation
studies are infeasible.
Revealed Preference. Revealed preference approaches are based
on observed decisions of individuals, often in other markets. From
these decisions, one can estimate or infer the value of an ecosystem
service.50 One example is the hedonic method, which estimates how
home buyers value different environmental attributes, such as a home’s
proximity to open space, flood risk levels, or local levels of air
pollution, by comparing the prices of homes with variations in these
attributes and controlling for all other aspects of a property that
influence selling prices.51 Using econometric approaches, this produces
an estimate of the value of the attribute for an average homebuyer,
often referred to as the “shadow price.”52 A similar approach, referred
to as travel cost, can estimate the value of different aspects of
recreation sites based on the cost spent to visit them.53
Another example of a revealed preference approach is referred to
as replacement cost value. This method uses the cost to replace an
ecosystem service with a built or engineered alternative as a rough
estimate of economic value.54 While this approach is convenient, it may
not be a close approximation of willingness-to-pay.55 For example, the
value of cleaner drinking water could be estimated based on how much
50. Kevin J. Boyle, Introduction to Revealed Preference Methods, in A PRIMER ON
NONMARKET VALUATION: THE ECONOMICS OF NON-MARKET GOODS AND RESOURCES 259
(Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003).
51. See, e.g., Patrick Bayer, Nathaniel Keohane & Christopher Timmins, Migration and
Hedonic Valuation: The Case of Air Quality, 58 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing
hedonic pricing techniques and accounting for migration costs); B. Bolitzer & N. R. Netusil, The
Impact of Open Spaces on Property Values in Portland, Oregon, 59 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 185, 186
(2000) (discussing the hedonic pricing technique).
52. A shadow price is the estimated price for a good that is not traded in a market. See David
A. Starrett, Shadow Pricing in Economics, 3 ECOSYSTEMS 1, 16 (2000) (recognizing “many goods
and services for which there are no markets (such as clean air, wildlife habitat, and fishing stocks)
as having value” and referring to this “‘price-like’ concept” as shadow price). On economic prices,
see generally Geoffrey Heal, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 3 ECOSYSTEMS 24 (2000).
53. Gardner Brown, Jr. & Robert Mendelsohn, The Hedonic Travel Cost Method, 66 REV.
ECON. & STATS. 427, 427 (1984).
54. For example:
[T]he presence of a wetland may reduce the cost of municipal water treatment for
drinking water because the wetland system filters and removes pollutants. It is
therefore tempting to use the cost of an alternative treatment method, such as the
building and operation of an industrial water treatment plant, to represent the value of
the wetland’s natural water treatment service.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, supra note 37, at 125.
55. Id.
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a city pays to build a water filtration plant.56 Yet this approach only
provides reliable estimates of economic value when the humanengineered alternative provides a truly equivalent service, is the leastcost alternative to providing the service, and the population would pay
these costs when faced with the absence of the ecosystem service.57
Valuation methods based on replacement cost are related to socalled averting expenditure approaches, which infer an economic value
from the amount spent to avoid or reduce environmental risks.58 For
instance, if a household buys a water filter to reduce contaminants, this
could be a lower-bound estimate for the value the household places on
clean water. However, such estimates generally cannot be treated as
exact because, for example, a household might purchase a filter for
reasons other than (or in addition to) risk reduction, such as improving
the water’s look or taste. As a result, adjustments are often required to
isolate the risk-reduction component of the expenditure.59
Revealed preference approaches such as these provide estimates
of the value of an ecosystem service at or near its current level of
provision and thus are useful for considering relatively small changes
in the level of service.60 However, revealed preference approaches may
not be appropriate for estimating the value of very large changes in the
level of service provided, as value may not scale linearly.61 For example,
56. See id. at 156–57 (discussing New York City’s choice to purchase lands within the
watershed to ensure a clean water supply instead of constructing a filtration plant).
57. Nancy E. Bockstael et al., On Measuring Economic Values for Nature, 34 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 1384, 1388 (2000).
58. Paul N. Courant & Richard C. Porter, Averting Expenditure and the Cost of Pollution, 8
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 321, 321 (1981); see, e.g., Brian W. Bresnahan, Mark Dickie & Shelby
Gerking, Averting Behavior and Urban Air Pollution, 73 LAND ECON. 340, 340 (1997) (explaining
“defensive responses to air pollution using determinants predicted by an averting behavior
model”). On the general method, see generally Mark Dickie, Defensive Behavior and Damage
Cost Methods, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 50, at 395.
59. Others have described this analysis:
To estimate the overstatement of averting costs we need to determine the unadjusted
aggregate averting costs as well as the adjusted aggregate averting costs. The
unadjusted costs are the expenditures without adjusting for quality differences, while
adjusted costs are the expenditures adjusted to reflect only risk averting behavior when
there is no difference in taste, odor, or appearance . . . relative to tap water.
Nii Adote Abrahams, Bryan J. Hubbell & Jeffrey L. Jordan, Joint Production and Averting
Expenditure Measures of Willingness to Pay: Do Water Expenditures Really Measure Avoidance
Costs?, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 427, 434 (2000) (citations omitted).
60. See generally ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER:
CONCEPTS AND METHODS (2005) (laying out methods to determine the value of water through
revealed preference approaches, among other methods).
61. See R. Kerry Turner, Sian Morse-Jones & Brendan Fisher, Ecosystem Valuation: A
Sequential Decision Support System and Quality Assessment Issues, 1185 ANN. N. Y. ACAD. SCI.
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the hedonic method may not accurately capture how much home
values would change if a heavily polluted stream were restored to
pristine quality or if a pristine stream suddenly became
overwhelmingly polluted.
Stated Preferences. A second approach to valuation is based on
stated preferences.62 These methods use surveys that directly elicit
willingness-to-pay from participants.63 Researchers have used this
method, for example, to estimate people’s willingness-to-pay to avoid
another oil spill similar to the infamous Exxon Valdez disaster.64
However, these surveys are vulnerable to potential biases, such as the
commonly observed difference between what survey participants state
they would be willing to pay and what they may actually pay in
practice.65 The way researchers ask questions and the order in which
they are asked can also influence responses. In addition, stated
preference methods assume that participants are sufficiently informed
to give meaningful answers.66 In response to these challenges
economists have identified sets of best practices to address these and

79, 82 (2010) (“The existence of nonlinearities in ecosystem services provision adds further
complexity to their valuation and subsequent management. Because many ecosystems typically
respond nonlinearly to disturbances, their supply may seem to be relatively unaffected by
increasing perturbation, until they suddenly reach a point at which a dramatic system-changing
response occurs . . . .”).
62. See W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8
J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20 (1994) (discussing surveys as a valuation method); Paul R. Portney, The
Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (1995) (“The
contingent valuation method involves the use of sample surveys (questionnaires) to elicit the
willingness of respondents to pay for (generally) hypothetical projects or programs.”).
63. See, e.g., John Loomis et al., Measuring the Total Economic Value of Restoring Ecosystem
Services in an Impaired River Basin: Results from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 33 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 103, 103 (2000) (“Households were asked a dichotomous choice willingness to pay
question regarding purchasing the increase in ecosystem services through a higher water bill.”).
64. Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 257, 257 (2003).
65. This is often referred to as hypothetical bias. E.g., John Loomis, What’s To Know About
Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation Studies?, 25 J. ECON. SURVS. 363, 363–64 (2011);
James J. Murphy, P. Geoffrey Allen, Thomas H. Stevens & Darryl Weatherhead, A MetaAnalysis of Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation, 30 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 313,
313 (2005).
66. See Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 895 (offering critiques of
contingent valuation methods based on surveys).
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other issues,67 yet criticisms remain.68 Despite these criticisms,
however, these types of studies are currently the only way to estimate
certain values, such as non-use values.69
Benefits Transfer. Undertaking original valuation studies with
either revealed or stated preference approaches can be expensive,
time-consuming, and require substantial expertise. As a result,
environmental economists have developed a method called “benefits
transfer” to use valuation estimates from one study and apply them
elsewhere.70 The challenge with the benefits transfer approach is that
service valuation is often context specific.71 For example, the value of a
coastal mangrove forest depends on its recreational access, the value
of property behind it, the risk of storm surge, whether there are similar
mangrove stands nearby, what species live in it, and so on. This means
that an ecosystem in one region might be valued quite differently than

67. See generally Robert J. Johnston et al., Contemporary Guidance for Stated Preference
Studies, 4 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 319, 323 (2017) (proposing “contemporary
best-practice recommendations for SP studies intended to inform decision making, grounded in
the accumulated body of knowledge from the peer-reviewed literature”). For a discussion of the
method and history of contingent valuation, see generally Richard T. Carson, Contingent
Valuation: A Practical Alternative when Prices Aren’t Available, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2012). For
the set of best practices inspired by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see Report of the NOAA Panel on
Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4602–14 (Jan. 15, 1993).
68. See Richard T. Carson, Contingent Valuation: A User’s Guide, 34 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
1413, 1415 (2000) (“There are several other issues surrounding the use of [contingent valuation].
These include the related issues of yea-saying, protest zeros, nay-saying, and calibration.”);
Hanemann, supra note 62, at 26 (“Small changes in question wording or order sometimes cause
significant changes in survey responses.” (citation omitted)).
69. See Richard T. Carson, Nicholas E. Flores & Norman F. Meade, Contingent Valuation:
Controversies and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 173, 197 (2001) (“Without stated
preference survey methods, though, economists have to admit that they are not measuring the
passive use aspects of environmental and other non-market goods, and that these are the aspects
about which people may care about most.”).
70. Randall S. Rosenberger & John B. Loomis, Benefit Transfer, in A PRIMER ON
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 50; see also Robert J. Johnston & Randall S. Rosenberger,
Methods, Trends and Controversies in Contemporary Benefit Transfer, 24 J. ECON. SURVS. 479,
479 (2010).
71. Others have expanded on this point:
Compensation measures cannot be defined in isolation. They are entirely dependent
on the context and may change as there is a change in one or more elements of that
context. This feature of economic values requires analysts to be specific about what is
obtained with the change as well as the default situation that exists without it.
Bockstael et al., supra note 57, at 1385; see also James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (arguing that
environmental goods and services like wetlands are context-dependent and therefore
nonfungible, a fact that complicates the creation of environmental trading mechanisms).
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the same type of ecosystem located elsewhere.72 Economic valuation is
also dependent on the surrounding population, its preferences, and its
income.73 Therefore, not only may the actual ecosystem’s physical
characteristics be different across locations, but the people benefiting
from those systems may vary as well—both of which will impact
valuation estimates.
The inherent difficulties in valuation make more appealing policy
approaches that can help ensure economically efficient levels of
ecosystem services without original and ongoing valuation studies.74 Of
course, valuation may sometimes be necessary for government costbenefit analyses and making truly informed trade-offs, and hard
numbers can influence policy development.75 Stakeholders may also
benefit from a clear identification of the value provided by ecosystems.
Still, conservation and restoration tools that do not require detailed or
precise economic valuation estimates ex ante—including several of the
insurance mechanisms discussed in Part III—are important and
worthwhile. The next Section examines the current law and
governance continuum to help situate the role of insurance within
more standard policy approaches.
C. A Law and Governance Continuum for Ecosystems
A continuum of legal and private governance mechanisms exists
to ensure the protection and, if necessary, restoration of ecosystem
services. These include direct public law regulation that bans certain
types of actions, regulatory permit-based systems, market-leveraging
approaches like payments for ecosystem services that combine public
law and private market activity, and acquisition of land by public or

72. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 71, at 622–30 (identifying nonfungibilities of space, time,
and type); see also Mark L. Plummer, Assessing Benefit Transfer for the Valuation of Ecosystem
Services, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 38, 38 (2009) (“[B]enefit transfer should not be
pursued blindly. Not all ecological systems are pearls of great price.”).
73. Economists have conducted research on income effects for certain nonmarket goods and
services and broadly investigated how environmental protection in communities and countries
varies with income levels. More problematic, however, is the concern that reported willingnessto-pay will be constrained by ability-to-pay and that the values of more affluent individuals could
dictate policy. This raises serious environmental justice concerns that must enter any policy
decision. See infra Part IV.
74. See Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 894 (noting that estimating the
future value of ecosystem services raises additional challenges).
75. Id. at 896–97.
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private actors.76 In addition, certain statutes provide for natural
resource damages to restore impaired ecosystems. Who bears the cost
of ensuring that the ecosystem services are provided or restored
depends on the statute. Some laws place the costs on beneficiaries of
the services, while others impose costs on taxpayers broadly. Still
others charge landowners seeking to alter land use in ways that reduce
the amount of services provided by their land.
While these methods may be effective in some contexts, they fall
short in others. This is not simply a question of how the existing statutes
are drafted—although modifying existing legal rules could improve
their effectiveness at the margins. Rather, this Article’s analysis
demonstrates that there are some significant gaps in the operation of
existing ex ante approaches to preventing harm to ecosystems
regardless of whether they employ prescriptive rules, permit systems,
market-leveraging approaches, or land acquisition programs. Ex post
statutory schemes that seek to restore ecosystems—like statutes
providing natural resource damages—also have significant
weaknesses. At the most basic level, none of these regimes can easily
account for the risk to ecosystems arising from catastrophic weather
events. Rather, their aim is either (a) to direct how “persons”—be they
natural persons or firms—manage ecosystems on privately owned land
to prevent harm, or (b) to make responsible parties (which must also
be “persons”) pay for harm to ecosystems that they have caused. A
catastrophic weather event, however, will not seek a permit from
regulators before destroying a coral reef as a private land developer
must. Nor will such a catastrophic weather event follow prescriptive
regulations detailing how a wetland can be damaged. And marketleveraging approaches like payments for ecosystem services, which are
based on a beneficiary pays principle, require the identification not
only of beneficiaries but also of those who own the resources. Thus,
traditional ecosystem services governance regimes falter when the
ecosystem is unowned.

76. See J.B. Ruhl, In Defense of Ecosystem Services, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 306, 312–14
(2015) (discussing the rise of the ecosystem framework in environmental law and policy
scholarship since its initial conceptualization in the 1990s); Lynn Scarlett & James Boyd,
Ecosystem Services and Resource Management: Institutional Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities
in the Public Sector, 115 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 3, 4–5 (2015) (discussing both specific statutory
programs and broad policy statements permitting or requiring the preservation of ecosystems and
noting challenges when addressing large spatial areas). On private environmental governance, see
generally Light & Orts, supra note 25.
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In addition to these overarching weaknesses, each governance
regime comes with its own set of specific limitations. This final
subsection of Part I briefly describes some of these existing methods of
governance, as well as their shortcomings, with the aim of giving
context to the Article’s later discussion of insurance. Although
insurance is not a panacea, it can fill some of the governance gaps that
we identify here which traditional methods fail to address.77
1. Prescriptive Rules. Prescriptive rules are one mechanism to
prevent harm to ecosystems. One of the strongest examples on the
governance continuum for ecosystem services is the prescriptive
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the
“take” of any listed species.78 The statute itself defines the term “take”
to encompass “harm.”79 The Department of the Interior (“DOI”)80 has
interpreted “harm” to include “an[y] act which actually kills or injures
wildlife” which may include “significant habitat modification or
degradation . . . by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,

77. See Light & Orts supra note 25, at 50–53 (noting that while insurance should be
considered a primary tool of environmental governance, it is not always included in the
environmental law “toolkit”). It is worth noting that these different forms of governance may
fulfill different goals. For example, in some cases the goal is to prevent destruction of ecosystem
services. In other cases, the goal is to repair damaged ecosystem services. In many cases, the
existence of a governance regime provides secondary information about ecosystem services that
can then be used to improve governance both through public law and private methods. Salzman,
Valuing Ecosystem Services, supra note 4, at 898–99 (noting the importance of the creation of
secondary information markets through existing regulations under the Oil Pollution Act, the
Clean Water Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act, among others); see also infra Part
IV.
78. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018) (providing that,
absent an exception, it is unlawful for any person to “take any [endangered] species within the
United States or the territorial sea of the United States”).
79. Id. § 1532(19) (defining “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct”).
80. The Department of the Interior, acting through the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”),
is one of two agencies authorized to interpret this statute. See Endangered Species: ESA
Implementation Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (June 6, 2018),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_esa/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3EXE-XNPN]
(“The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service collaborates . . . to achieve on-the-ground conservation for
species and habitats around the country.”). The other is the Department of Commerce, acting
through the National Marine Fisheries Service. Endangered Species Conservation, NOAA
FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/endangered-species-conservation [https://
perma.cc/7W9V-CVST] (“NOAA Fisheries is responsible for the protection, conservation, and
recovery of endangered and threatened marine and anadromous species under the Endangered
Species Act.”).
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including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”81 In Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,82 the Supreme Court
upheld the DOI’s definition of the term “harm,” making clear that
habitat cannot be significantly modified or destroyed if such
modification actually kills or injures protected wildlife, even when that
habitat exists on privately owned land.83 In essence, the regulation (and
decision) codified protections for habitat provision, a supporting
ecosystem service that allows the continued delivery of a range of other
services that depend on healthy animal and plant communities.84
In addition, § 7 of the ESA, which applies to federal agencies,
more directly regulates actions that could jeopardize endangered or
threatened species or harm their “critical habitat.”85 Specifically, that
section provides that federal agencies must consult with the Secretary
of the Interior or Commerce to ensure that “any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat
of such species,” absent an exemption.86 While this section might
appear to have a narrower scope, both because it only applies to a
subset of habitat—critical habitat—and because it only applies to
federal agencies, the section actually sweeps quite broadly. Because
federal permitting, licensing, and funding decisions are covered under
this provision, § 7’s direction that critical habitat should not be
adversely modified operates comprehensively.87 And by virtue of this
81. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2019) (“Harm in the definition of ‘take’ in the Act means an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”).
82. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
83. Id. at 697–703.
84. Ecosystem Services & Biodiversity (ESB), FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
N ATIONS , http://www.fao.org/ecosystem-services-biodiversity/background/supportingservices/en [https://perma.cc/W8XX-TFNQ]; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2018). Critical habitat is a subset of “habitat,” which is not defined
under the ESA. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 369 (2018)
(holding that “critical habitat” must also be “habitat”). The Act defines “critical habitat” as
“specific areas” within and outside “the geographical area occupied by the species” at the time of
listing on which physical or biological features that are “essential to the conservation of the
species” and “which may require special management considerations or protection” are found.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
87. The Weyerhaeuser Court noted that “[a] critical-habitat designation does not directly
limit the rights of private landowners” but rather operates indirectly such that if the Secretary of
the Interior determines that a federal agency permitting decision would adversely affect critical
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broad mandate, § 7 also applies to a large swath of private actions,
including many commercial, residential, or industrial efforts to develop
land.88
However, the ESA’s prohibitions are not absolute. While the ESA
is on the strong end of the governance continuum for ecosystems, it is
not without exception. For example, federal agencies whose actions
may jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat can
seek an exemption from the Endangered Species Committee, a
cabinet-level body specifically empowered to authorize such actions.89
In addition, the Committee may grant an exemption if the Secretary of
Defense finds such an exemption is necessary for national security
reasons.90 And the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce may likewise
permit “any taking” otherwise prohibited by § 9 “if such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity.”91 Such an “incidental take” permit under § 10 must be
accompanied by a habitat conservation plan that spells out the steps an
applicant will take to mitigate harm to endangered species. However,
these plans have been criticized for failing to adequately protect listed
species and their habitats.92
The ESA also has other limitations. First, while the determination
of whether a species should be listed as endangered or threatened is to
be made solely on the basis of “the best scientific and commercial data
available,” a determination of critical habitat—the ecosystem-services
determination—permits the consideration of both the best scientific
data and the “economic impact, the impact on national security, and

habitat, “the agency must terminate the action, implement an alternative proposed by the
Secretary, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee.” 139 S.
Ct. at 365–66.
88. Jessica Owley, Keeping Track of Conservation, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 86–87 (2015).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(h) (defining the composition of the Committee, procedures for
seeking an exemption, and the basis on which exemptions may be granted). Because this
Committee essentially has the power to permit an endangered species to become extinct, it has
been dubbed the “God Squad.” ROCKY BARKER, SAVING ALL THE PARTS: RECONCILING
ECONOMICS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 20, 155 (1993) (explaining the history of the
“God Squad” nickname).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j).
91. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
92. Owley, supra note 88, at 89–93 (critiquing the lack of sufficient public participation in
habitat conservation plans, their lack of funding, and the lack of follow up to determine their
effectiveness); J.B. Ruhl, How To Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of
Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. L. 345, 352–53
(1999). As of 2015, nearly seven hundred habitat conservation plans had been issued. Owley,
supra note 88, at 89.
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any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical
habitat.”93 Second, while ecosystems provide numerous services, the
ESA only protects an ecosystem when a single one of those services—
habitat provision—is in jeopardy. As a result, other modifications to an
ecosystem that negatively affect ecosystem services, but that do not
affect endangered or threatened species, cannot trigger the ESA’s
prescriptions.94 Third, the ESA does not cover a situation in which the
habitat is destroyed or degraded as a result of an action not undertaken
by a “person,” such as that resulting from an extreme weather event.
Fourth, the ESA does not provide any compensation or funding to
restore ecosystem services that have been degraded or destroyed.
Finally, the costs of preserving the ecosystem services are primarily
borne by the private landowner seeking to develop the property. Thus,
while the ESA’s prescriptive rules provide some strong protections,
they are limited, and its approach is of little help in restoring ecosystem
services once they are degraded.
2. Regulatory Permits. A second, related approach to
protecting ecosystem services requires private actors to obtain a permit
before undertaking land use changes or other actions that could
degrade those services.95 This approach is perhaps best exemplified by
the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) § 404 permit regime.96 Section 301 of
the CWA generally prohibits the discharge of any “pollutant” into the
waters of the United States by any person.97 “Pollutant” is defined
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). On August 27, 2019, the Departments of the Interior and
Commerce published a final rule interpreting this section that recognizes that the listing decision
is to be made “solely on the basis of the best available scientific and commercial information
regarding a species’ status,” 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b) (emphasis in original), but deletes the words
“without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such determination” on the basis
that the Act “does not prohibit the Services from compiling economic information or presenting
that information to the public, as long as such information does not influence the listing
determination.” Dep’t of the Interior (FWS), Dep’t of Commerce (NOAA), Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat,
84 Fed. Reg. 45020, 45024 (Aug. 27, 2019). On September 25, 2019, seventeen states, the City of
New York, and the District of Columbia sued these Departments to challenge this and other
changes to the regulations under the ESA. Complaint, California v. Bernhardt, No. 3:19-cv-06013
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019).
94. Of course, if the habitat of an endangered or threatened species must be protected, then
protection of the habitat will protect other ecosystem services provided by that habitat.
95. In practice, the Clean Water Act permit program is ultimately not so different from the
approach under the ESA, which contains a prohibition, but allows applications for exemptions.
96. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2018).
97. Id. § 1311(a) (explaining that except in compliance with the CWA permit systems, “the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”).
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broadly and is not limited to toxic pollutants, but includes such
ordinary materials as sand.98 However, § 404 of the Act allows
discharges of “dredged or fill material” into such waters, if the person
first obtains a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.99 The Army
Corps and the EPA, which has regulatory authority under other
sections of the Act, have jointly issued regulations over the years that
interpret the term “waters of the United States” to include some
wetlands.100 Unlike the ESA, which only protects one type of
ecosystem service—habitat provision—the § 404 permit program,
which is triggered by the placement of dredged or fill material into a
wetland, applies regardless of what ecosystem services the discharge of
dredged or fill material might endanger.
The § 404 permit regime is limited in four ways, however. First,
like the ESA, the CWA’s protections are not absolute, because
numerous § 404 permits are granted each year—indeed, that is the very

98. Id. § 1362(6); Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 160 (2014)
(discussing the § 404 permit program and noting the broad definition of pollutant to include sand).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. In reviewing these permits, the Army Corps follows guidelines adopted
jointly with the EPA. See generally Memorandum Between The Department of the Army and
The Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 1989) (allocating enforcement authority between
the Army and the EPA and noting that both agencies share this authority under the CWA). For
a look at these guidelines see U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
PERMITTING
PROCESS
INFORMATION,
https://www.lrl.usace.army.mil/Portals/64/
docs/regulatory/Permitting/PermittingProcessInformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9HH-2P9K].
In some cases, when a permit is granted, the harm to the wetland requires the purchase of offsets
through wetlands mitigation banking. Because one acre of wetland in one location is not
necessarily equivalent to one acre of wetland elsewhere in terms of the services provided, wetland
mitigation banking has been criticized. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 71, at 607 (calling into
question the rationale for using environmental trading markets).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (noting that the Army Corps’s permit decisions must be made
through the application of guidelines developed by the EPA administrator “in conjunction with”
the Secretary of the Army); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–39 (2006) (holding that
the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” adopted by the Army Corps and the
EPA was too broad, but offering competing definitions of the test for whether wetlands qualify
for federal protection); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2018) (defining traditionally navigable waters and
adjacent wetlands to include those that have a “significant nexus” to traditionally navigable
waters); id. § 328.3(c) (defining “adjacent wetlands” to include wetlands bordering traditionally
navigable waters even if “separated from [such] waters . . . by constructed dikes . . . and the like”).
Most recently, on September 12, 2019, the EPA and Army Corps jointly published a final rule to
repeal the more expansive 2015 definition of “Waters of the United States” and to “restore the
regulatory text that existed prior to the 2015 Rule.” See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE & U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0203, PRE-PUBLICATION NOTICE: DEFINITION OF
“WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”—RECODIFICATION OF PRE-EXISTING RULES (Signed Sept.
12,
2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-09/documents/wotus_rin-2040af74_final_frn_prepub2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES9L-DXSW].
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purpose of a permit program.101 Second, like the ESA, the CWA only
prohibits “persons” from engaging in a specific action—placing
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States from a point
source.102 It does not contemplate or address harm to wetland
ecosystems that result from natural disasters or extreme weather
events.
Third, uncertainty about what qualifies as a wetland for purposes
of the Act has limited the protective capacity of this statute over time.
The shifting definition of “waters of the United States” has been
controversial for many years because it implicates whether the federal
government has control over what some consider to be “local” land use
decisions.103 In 2015, the Obama administration adopted the Clean
Water Rule, with a relatively broad definition of the term.104 That rule
was immediately subject to litigation.105 On December 11, 2018, the
Trump administration issued a proposed rule narrowing the scope of
the wetlands covered under this provision to those with a surface
connection to traditionally navigable waters.106 And on September 12,
2019, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers issued a final rule

101. For a permit to be granted, an applicant must make efforts to avoid and minimize the
most harmful effects on the resource and may be required to engage in “compensatory
mitigation” such as the preservation of other ecosystems or wetlands through mitigation banking.
40 C.F.R. § 230 (2019). However, scholars have criticized some of these measures as inadequate,
because offsets that preserve wetlands in other locations are generally not comparable. Salzman
& Ruhl, supra note 71, at 607.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (stating that except in compliance with the CWA permit systems,
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”).
103. Biber & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 161–62 (describing the “long and often tortuous history”
of the evolving geographic reach of the § 404 permit program); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737–38
(expressing the concern that the expansive definition of the term would intrude on the states’
“traditional and primary power over land and water use” (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001))). It is worth noting that in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018), the Supreme Court
indicated that while the ESA defines the term “critical habitat,” it does not define the term
“habitat.” Id. at 369. Thus, the definition of the term “habitat” may, like the definition of the term
“waters of the United States,” be a basis for future battles over the scope of federal protection of
endangered and threatened species. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Thanks also to J.B.
Ruhl for discussions on this point.
104. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,104
(June 29, 2015); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2018) (using the “significant nexus” standard for wetlands
adjacent to traditionally navigable waters).
105. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 635–27 (2018) (noting that multiple
parties had challenged the Clean Water Rule in both district courts and courts of appeals and
discussing the history of the shifting definitions).
106. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 83 Fed. Reg. 67174 (Dec. 28, 2018)
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
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formally revoking the 2015 Clean Water Rule and reinstating the
regulatory definition that existed prior to 2015.107 The agencies
indicated that they would issue the final substantive rule in the
future.108 This significant uncertainty leaves open to question the extent
to which wetlands and the ecosystem services they provide will be
protected from development. Some significant ecosystem services
could remain unprotected by this federal permit program.109
Finally, § 404 does not address the restoration of damaged
wetlands. Rather, the general aim of the permit system is mitigation or
prevention of harm ex ante. And as in the ESA, all of these costs are
borne by the entity seeking to develop the property. Accordingly, while
the § 404 permit system serves important goals by helping to prevent
the destruction of some wetlands and their ecosystem services, it does
not adequately address concerns about scope and restoration raised
here. As noted above, absolute protection of an ecosystem is simply
incompatible with the notion of a permit system that allows some
destruction under some circumstances.
3. Market-Leveraging Approaches: Payments for Ecosystem
Services. A third approach to ecosystem-service protection relies on
market-based or incentive-based mechanisms.110 These cost-effective
policy approaches harness the market to achieve beneficial
environmental outcomes. Examples include taxes, subsidies, and
tradable permit systems.
Payments for ecosystem services (“PES”) are yet another marketbased approach to providing ecosystem services that have risen to
prominence in the last several decades.111 Dr. Sven Wunder has defined
107. See supra note 100.
108. EPA, U.S. Army Repeal 2015 Rule Defining “Waters of the United States” Ending
Regulatory Patchwork (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-us-army-repeal2015-rule-defining-waters-united-states-ending-regulatory-patchwork [https://perma.cc/HY33Z9BV].
109. Indeed, while federal regulation might not protect a wetland, the CWA permit program
provides that the states have a role to play and could nonetheless protect ecosystem services
provided by wetlands more stringently. See Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J.
1647, 1666–67 (2018) (observing that states play a backstop role under the CWA, even in the face
of narrowing federal protections).
110. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (addressing and
investigating issues regarding market-based approaches).
111. James Salzman et al., The Global Status and Trends of Payments for Ecosystem Services,
1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 136, 137–40 (2018) [hereinafter Salzman et al., Global Status and
Trends] (surveying and evaluating the effectiveness of extant global examples of PES, including
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“[a] PES scheme . . . [a]s a voluntary, conditional agreement between
at least one ‘seller’ and one ‘buyer’ over a well-defined environmental
service—or a land use presumed to produce that service.”112 The
mechanism of PES relies upon a simple premise: the services that
ecosystems can provide to consumers are not so different from the
valuable goods they provide for sale in the marketplace.113 Indeed,
many scholars have recognized that markets can provide financial
incentives to protect ecosystem services on private lands.114 Ultimately,
the PES approach suggests that the beneficiary of the service should
pay, or bear the costs, of ecosystem-service provision.115
PES schemes can take a number of different forms depending on
who is “buying” and who is “selling” the services. Because ecosystem
services are public goods, the government (which is ultimately funded
by society through taxes or other government revenue) often fills the
role of the buyer, using its payments to ensure private actors provide
the service.116 Who bears the costs of these services can be more
dynamic, however, so one group of scholars has recently classified PES
schemes into three broad types: voluntary PES, subsidy PES, and
compliance PES.117 In a voluntary PES program, private parties benefit
from the ecosystem services and voluntarily enter into some kind of
contractual agreement to compensate the landowners.118 In a subsidy
PES program, the government or some other public entity pays the
landowners whether or not the government is a “direct beneficiary” of
the services.119 Finally, in compliance PES programs, parties acting

watershed PES, forest and land use carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and habitat protection);
cf. S. Naeem et al., Get the Science Right When Paying for Nature’s Services, 347 SCIENCE 1206,
1207 (2015) (proposing guidelines and principles to govern the use of natural science in research
and analysis of PES mechanisms).
112. Sven Wunder, The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 48 (2007).
113. Id. at 49.
114. Thompson, supra note 29, at 462 (“Rather than being viewed as a ‘public good’ that
governments provide because it is the ‘right thing to do,’ ecosystems could become valuable
economic assets that people privately pay to conserve for the valuable services that the ecosystems
provide.”).
115. Stefanie Engel, Stefano Pagiola & Sven Wunder, Designing Payments for Environmental
Services in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 663, 663–64
(2008).
116. Id. at 663.
117. Salzman et al., Global Status and Trends, supra note 111, at 136 (offering these three
categories).
118. Id. (explaining the three categories of PES programs).
119. Id.
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pursuant to some regulatory obligation like the CWA § 404 permit
program purchase “offsets” of comparable ecosystems services to
mitigate any harms they may cause if their development project moves
forward.120
There are many examples of PES programs globally. For instance,
in the United States, the Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”) pays
farmers to promote land-conservation practices on their farms,
including the preservation of topsoil and wildlife-habitat
conservation.121 In Australia, the State of Victoria’s Department of
Natural Resources and Environment adopted a PES program to
promote the conservation of native vegetation on privately owned
land.122 In 1997, Costa Rica adopted a PES program called Pagos por
Servicios Ambientales.123 This program authorizes the government to
enter into contracts with private landowners to pay them for providing
carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, aesthetic services that
promote tourism, and water-quality protection.124 China also has
extensive PES programs under the Sloping Lands Conversion
Program, which pays farmers not to cultivate steep slopes to protect
water quality and flood-control services.125
In some respects, PES programs are a superior approach to
prescriptive regimes like the ESA (especially from the perspective of
the landholder). Namely, under a PES scheme, the landholder actually
derives some financial value from the payments. In contrast, regulatory
schemes like § 9 of the ESA arguably burden landowners with the cost
of compliance without providing additional financial benefits.
However, PES programs have been the subject of criticism as well.126
120. Id.
121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3836 (2018); 7 C.F.R. pt. 1410 (2018); Salzman, Creating Markets,
supra note 12, at 892; Farm Serv. Agency, Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/conservation-reserveprogram [https://perma.cc/QK6A-RKCU]. The program was signed into law in 1985 by President
Reagan and provides that farmers enter into long-term contracts with the U.S. Farm Service
Agency lasting between ten and fifteen years, on average. Id.
122. Salzman, Creating Markets, supra note 12, at 892–97.
123. Id. at 898. For an analysis of the Costa Rica program, see generally Kenneth M. Chomitz,
Esteban Brenes & Luis Constantino, Financing Environmental Services: The Costa Rican
Experience and Its Implications, 240 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 157 (1999).
124. Chomitz, Brenes & Constantino, supra note 123, at 158.
125. Salzman et al., Global Status and Trends, supra note 111, at 137.
126. See, e.g., Kai M.A. Chan et al., Payments for Ecosystem Services: Rife with Problems and
Potential—For Transformation Towards Sustainability, 140 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 110, 110–22
(2017); Nicolás Kosoy & Esteve Corbera, Payments for Ecosystem Services as Commodity
Fetishism, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1228, 1228–36 (2010); R. Muradian et al., Payments for
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Notably, while PES programs can lead to greater conservation on
certain parcels of land, destructive environmental practices can just
shift elsewhere—a process known as “leakage” or “slippage.”127 In
other words, a PES program does not guarantee a minimum total level
of service is provided. And while PES might be effective when
ecosystems are located on private land, it is not clear how they would
fare on public lands and waters or ecosystems like the ocean that are
not “owned” by private landowners.
4. Land Acquisition. Public and private actors can wield
property law to protect ecosystem services, primarily through land
acquisition. In the purely public context, for example, governments can
use the power of eminent domain to preserve ecosystem services.128 To
illustrate, when New York City chose to use natural capital to protect
its drinking water supply rather than construct a water filtration plant,
it used the power and threat of eminent domain to acquire land for a
system of reservoirs and surrounding properties to ensure the purity of
its water.129 Alternatively, governments can designate areas as national,
state, or local public lands.130 In the private realm, nongovernmental or

Ecosystem Services and the Fatal Attraction of Win Win Solutions, 6:4 CONSERVATION LETTERS
274, 274–79 (2013); Mike Gaworecki, Cash for Conservation: Do Payments for Ecosystem Services
Work?, MONGABAY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://news.mongabay.com/2017/10/cash-for-conservationdo-payments-for-ecosystem-services-work [https://perma.cc/3U2E-F2JE].
127. See Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 115, at 670–71 (defining leakage and slippage).
For one study that measured slippage impacts for the case of a PES program in Mexico, see
generally Jennifer M. Alix-Garcia, Elizabeth N. Shapiro, & Katharine R. E. Sims, Forest
Conservation and Slippage: Evidence from Mexico’s National Payments for Ecosystem Services
Program, 88 LAND ECON. 613 (2012).
128. Kalyani Robbins, Allocating Property Interests in Ecosystem Services: From Chaos to
Flowing Rivers, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 207–10 (2018) (discussing the power of eminent
domain to protect ecosystem services but observing that property rights in the services themselves
are unclear and conflicting in different contexts).
129. Id. at 207.
130. J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and Federal Public Lands: Start-Up Policy Questions and
Research Needs, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 275, 276 (2010) (observing that as the “largest
landowner in the nation,” the federal government and its land management agencies should
naturally be concerned with how to “manage the flow of ecosystem services on and off of its
landholdings”). These four land management agencies are the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Parks Service. Id. at 278. Ruhl
contends that these agencies’ missions are not styled in relation to the provisioning of ecosystem
services, and indeed, that federal lands are not solely concerned with those services that have
economic value. Id. at 279. Rather, the protection of ecosystem services is “only . . . an incidental
effect of implementing the conservation goal.” Id. at 279.
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conservation organizations like The Nature Conservancy can purchase
and set aside land for conservation purposes.131
Although land acquisition can further the conservation of
ecosystem services, it also has flaws. On the one hand, land ownership
can be overprotective of ecosystem services. It may not always
necessary to protect all of the services on a parcel at any cost—perhaps
only the vegetation must be preserved, for example. At the same time,
ownership can also underprotect ecosystem services because merely
holding title to land does not guarantee that government
appropriations (in the case of public lands) or private funds (in the case
of private conservation land) will be available to finance ecosystem
restoration. Finally, even powerful tools like eminent domain have
transaction costs—such as legal fees arising from challenges to
condemnation proceedings—and might require paying a stiff political
price, as well.132
5. Natural Resource Damages and Liability Rules. Each of the
tools addressed up to this point has largely focused on preventing harm
to ecosystem services rather than restoration after damage. However,
certain statutory mechanisms can be employed both to prevent damage
in the first place and restore ecosystems if they are degraded. For
example, when companies or individuals damage an ecosystem, tort
law and statutory liability rules can provide funds for restoration while
simultaneously acting to deter such behavior in the future.133
There are two well-established programs under U.S. law that
address liability for restoration: provisions for natural resource
damages under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

131. Thomas C. Brown, John C. Bergstrom & John B. Loomis, Defining, Valuing, and
Providing Ecosystem Goods and Services, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 361 (2007) (noting that
property ownership, either by public or private entities, is the “most obvious way to constrain the
practices permitted on a plot of land”). There are lesser methods of limiting use of land than
outright ownership, including through regulatory means such as a Wild and Scenic River or
wilderness designation. Id.
132. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937) (discussing legal or
regulatory costs as transaction costs). Such costs may include attorneys’ fees, expert-witness fees,
and other litigation costs. See Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just
Compensation,” 21 STAN. L. REV. 693, 698–99 (1969) (discussing costs in eminent domain
litigation).
133. The term “liability rule” refers to an entitlement that may be destroyed if someone is
“willing to pay an objectively determined value for it” such as a value determined by a court.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
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Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),134 also known as
Superfund, and similar provisions under the Oil Pollution Act
(“OPA”).135 Under these statutes, “natural resources” are defined as
“land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by” the United States,
or a state, local, tribal, or foreign government.136 Natural resource
“damages” are the result of the “injury or loss of natural resources,”
and include the cost of restoring the resource to its baseline condition,
compensation for the interim loss of injured resources pending
recovery, and the reasonable cost of a damage assessment.137
While these programs directly address the restoration of damaged
natural resources—a tool exactly on point with the problems raised
here—they also have their flaws. The first limitation is their timing. The
assessment and restoration of natural resource damages generally
“takes place following cleanup.”138 This is so because some cleanups
also “effectively restore habitat.”139 However, not all cleanups restore
all of the relevant damaged ecosystems, and thus restoration must
sometimes wait. Cleanups under CERCLA and the OPA can take
years or even decades.140 And many cases settle with long time horizons
for payment and restoration. For example, after the 2010 explosion at
British Petroleum’s (“BP”) Deepwater Horizon oil rig caused the most
severe oil spill in U.S. history, BP settled and agreed to pay up to $8.8
billion for the restoration of natural resources including wildlife

134. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”), Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 101(6), 107(a)(4)(C), 94 Stat. 2767, 2767, 2781 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
135. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”), Pub. L. No. 101-380, §§ 1001(5), 1002(b)(2), 104 Stat.
484, 486, 489–90 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2702(b)(2) (2018)); Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2018); Natural Resource Damage Assessments,
15 C.F.R. pt. 990 (2018).
136. CERCLA § 101(16) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2018)); OPA
§ 1001(20) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20)).
137. CERCLA §§ 101(6), 107(a)(4)(C) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(6),
9607(a)(4)(c)); OPA §§ 1001(5), 102(b)(2) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5),
2702(b)(2)); 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(l); 15 C.F.R. § 990.30.
138. Natural Resource Damages: A Primer, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (emphasis added),
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/natural-resource-damages-primer [https://perma.cc/PK5XDUZX].
139. Id.
140. Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/national-priorities-list-npl-sites-state [https://perma.cc/T6HAP66G] (listing some sites on the National Priorities List for remediation since the 1980s).
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refuges, habitats, water quality, migratory birds, threatened and
endangered species, and federal lands.141 But the payment schedule
under the settlement lasts fifteen years.142 Thus, it can be years or even
decades before damaged resources are restored and returned to
baseline conditions. Second, liability regimes require the identification
of the person or entity responsible for the damages. As a result, these
regimes cannot easily account for damages from severe weather events
that arguably have no identifiable responsible party or parties causing
them. To be sure, while sometimes there is a responsible party and
sometimes there are such significant damages to natural resources that
they will necessarily take time to restore, in other cases the damage is
caused by extreme weather events and restoration can and must
proceed quickly.
To summarize, there are many different public policy and private
governance instruments that promote the conservation of ecosystem
services, though some have limited scope. While there is at least one
policy instrument (natural resource damages) that broadly promotes
their restoration once damaged, CERCLA and the OPA have a narrow
focus on certain types of pollution that requires identifying a
defendant. And neither regime provides restoration funds quickly. As
such, none of these instruments promotes the speedy restoration of
ecosystem services that lack an owner or that are injured by an event
rather than by the actions of a “person.” Therefore, it is worth looking
to innovative tools—like insurance—to determine whether it is
possible to fill these gaps.
II. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE
This Part identifies and explains the basics of insurance as a form
of governance that transfers risk and provides incentives for riskreducing activities. It then discusses the conditions of insurability and
explains the differences between two primary forms of insurance:
indemnity-based insurance and parametric insurance. This discussion
includes an evaluation of the circumstances under which insurance is
and ought to be private or public. The next Part then builds on this
basic primer to explore how insurance can be used in innovative ways

141. Nanciann Regalado, Historic NRDAR Settlement Reached for Deepwater Horizon Spill,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (June 21, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/restoration/historic-nrdarsettlement-reached-deepwater-horizon-spill [https://perma.cc/TBX9-EDYL].
142. Id.
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to protect and restore ecosystems, particularly in the context of climate
change.
A. Transferring Risk
Insurance is a tool to smooth income. Insureds pay a set amount—
the premium—to guarantee access to funds should they suffer specified
damages. Risk averse individuals are willing to pay more than their
expected loss in order to transfer risk to another entity with more
ability to pool the risk.143 This is because, for a risk averse individual, it
is welfare enhancing to transfer funds from a state of the world with no
loss to the state of the world in which a loss occurs.144 Insurance is thus
an important part of risk management. It provides protection against a
financial loss that the insured could not otherwise fund on his or her
own or that would otherwise require diverting current income, taking
on additional debt, or using savings in order to pay.
Insurance’s risk-transferring ability can also promote beneficial
economic activities which might not otherwise be undertaken,
especially when the potential losses associated with the activities are
devastating.145 Consider, for example: medical liability insurance,
which allows physicians to work without worry of being bankrupted by
a lawsuit; mortgage insurance, which protects lenders who may not
otherwise write certain loans; auto insurance, which empowers people
to drive without having to set aside a large fund to cover possible
accident damages; or the financial protection against accidents
provided to those constructing high-rises or infrastructure.146
Insurance is, therefore, a tool that provides access to substantial
capital in disaster situations—when such capital is most needed.
However, if money cannot replace what was lost, insuring the object

143. For a broader discussion of insurance, see generally Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly,
Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECON. 63
(2006).
144. Insurance thus transfers income from states where the marginal utility of income is low
to those where the marginal utility of income is high. See David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser,
Extending the Theory to Meet the Practice of Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES 5 (Robert Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004).
145. On the broad contributions of insurance to the economy, see generally STEVEN
WEISBART, HOW INSURANCE DRIVES ECONOMIC GROWTH (2018), https://www.iii.org/sites/
default/files/docs/pdf/insurance-driver-econ-growth-053018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FUN-ERDY].
146. One example is the “Big Dig” project in Boston, undertaken to improve congestion,
reclaim greenspace, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It would not have been initiated had it
not been possible for all the contractors and construction companies involved to have purchased
insurance. See id. at 12–13.
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does not make sense. For instance, family photographs that hold
sentimental value but little financial value cannot be insured. Being
paid some amount of money if they are damaged will not make it
possible to replace them. Some natural resources and ecosystem
services are similarly uninsurable. For example, no amount of money
could replace the loss of Methuselah, the oldest living tree. On the
other hand, many ecosystems can be repaired or restored with proper
post-disaster funding. This could include capital to repair damaged
coral, to replant a burnt forest, or to stabilize slopes with new plantings.
There are other times insurance may not be an appropriate tool.
For example, insurance is not necessary for inconsequential risks, such
as the risk of breaking a chair or a plate. Administrative costs would
make it uneconomic to transfer these risks to others, as they can easily
be handled directly by the insured. At the other end of the spectrum,
systemic and catastrophic risks—risks that impact a large population
with catastrophic losses (such as an asteroid strike or nuclear war)—
will also not be cost-effective to transfer. They are simply too expensive
for even a globally diversified insurance company to insure.147
With these limits in mind, economists have developed a
framework of ideal insurability conditions.148 Namely, to be insurable,
risks must be random, well-enough understood to make pricing and
underwriting possible, diversifiable, and exist in markets with low
levels of moral hazard and adverse selection. Each of these conditions
is discussed in turn.
First, losses must be due to random chance. There must be a risk,
rather than a certainty.149 No insurer would write a policy for a known
adverse event at a price less than the full cost because risk transfer in
that situation produces no gain. Therefore, long-term, inevitable
threats such as sea-level rise cannot typically be insured against. The
risk in any given year of tidal flooding, however, may be insurable.
Second, the risk must be well-enough understood to allow for
pricing and underwriting. If the risk is not well understood, insurers

147. See Christian Gollier, About the Insurability of Catastrophic Risks, 22 GENEVA PAPERS
ON RISK & INS. 177, 179 (1997). For a broader discussion of catastrophic risks and how to manage

them, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004).
148. See, e.g., Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 144, at 3–5 (discussing insurability conditions
for health, life, personal property, business liability, and terrorism insurance); Joan T. Schmit, A
New View of the Requisites of Insurability, 53 J. RISK & INS. 320, 320–21 (2004) (listing the seven
requisites of ideally insurable risk).
149. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921) (distinguishing
risk from uncertainty).
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cannot determine how much premium to charge or whether a risk is
worth adding to their portfolio. For instance, the insurer may worry
about the potential for catastrophic losses if they price premiums too
low or accept too many high risks. Often pricing is done using historic
data, but also—especially for rare, changing, or uncertain risks—with
modeling.150 Risks do not have to be perfectly estimated, however,
since insurers can and do charge higher prices for risks that are
ambiguous or difficult to model.151 But if insurers are too uncertain
about a risk, they may shy away from the market completely.
Third, risk pooling must be possible. This requires a substantial
number of insureds whose risks are independent of each other and for
which catastrophic losses are not possible. These are the conditions
under which the average claim approaches the expected value (thanks
to the Law of Large Numbers) and the policyholder’s expected loss will
be approximated by the population’s expected loss (thanks to the
Central Limit Theorem).152 In this case, the premium charged can be
closer to the expected loss, plus any administrative loadings. As a
result, an insurance firm can be more confident that its revenues will
be sufficient to cover losses in any given year and prevent
bankruptcy.153
Disaster risks, however, can be both dependent and catastrophic,
making them more difficult to insure. For instance, when one person
gets into an automobile accident, it does not make it more likely that
all of her neighbors will as well. But when a hurricane or flood occurs,
entire communities all sustain damage at the same time, meaning the
insurer must pay them all at the same time. Disasters can also be
extreme in magnitude. Many natural disasters have fat-tailed
distributions, meaning there is a higher-than-normal probability of a
very severe event. As such, insurers need to have access to very large
amounts of capital in a given year to cover disaster losses without going
150. On catastrophe risk modeling, see generally CATASTROPHE MODELING: A NEW
APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK (Patricia Grossi & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2005).
151. Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 386, 387–89 (1985).
152. These two related mathematical theorems are the basis for risk pooling. As more risks
are added to the pool, the variation is reduced, and it is less likely that funding will be insufficient.
For a discussion of these theorems and their application to insurance, see generally Michael L.
Smith & Stephen A. Kane, The Law of Large Numbers and the Strength of Insurance, in
INSURANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ROBERT I.
MEHR (Sandra G. Gustavson & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1994).
153. For a deeper treatment, see generally Ray Rees & Achim Wambach, The
Microeconomics of Insurance, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECON. 1 (2008).
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bankrupt—more than they take in from annual premiums.154 This can
make disaster insurance prohibitively expensive.
Finally, the market must also be subject to minimal levels of moral
hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insureds
engage in excessively risky activities knowing that they are insured and
the risks are not appropriately priced.155 An example of moral hazard
would be homeowners failing to adopt flood risk reduction measures,
such as moving heating and cooling systems to higher levels of a home,
because they know that they will receive a payout after the next storm
to replace their damaged systems. With adverse selection, the insured
knows more about their risk than the insurer, leading only high-risk
individuals to insure, thus “unraveling” the market.156 For instance,
adverse selection has been invoked to support the Affordable Care
Act’s “individual mandate,” which requires all people, not merely
those who know they are sick and need medical care, to purchase
insurance on health insurance markets.157
Insurance premiums in a well-functioning private market are
directly tied to the risk. Although regulators may suppress prices, in
most private insurance markets, insurers still charge higher prices for
higher risks. This means insurance markets may be able to create
incentives to reduce risk by rewarding insureds’ investments in risk
reduction with lower premiums.158 To date, research on this topic has

154. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and
Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 208 (1997).
155. Seminal early work on moral hazard includes: Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S.
Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); and
Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968). For
an overview, see generally David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral
Hazard,” 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051 (2012).
156. Economic work on adverse selection begins with these seminal papers: George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488 (1970) and Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629
(1976).
157. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–49 (2012) (discussing the
purpose of the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act to ensure that healthy individuals
do not delay purchasing insurance until they are ill, and to force healthy individuals into the risk
pool to subsidize the cost of covering those who are ill without drastically increasing premiums).
158. Multiple states—including Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, New York, South Carolina, and Texas—require insurance companies to offer
premium discounts for certain wind-hazard mitigation investments, or they have state insurance
programs that offer such discounts. For instance, insurers may be required to charge a lower
premium if homeowners install hurricane shutters or storm-resistant roofs, doors, and garages,
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tended to focus on using premium reductions on standard property
insurance to provide incentives for individual action, such as roof
retrofits. Very little work has been done on the ability of insurance to
both incentivize ecosystem protection and provide risk-reduction
benefits. To the extent that it has been discussed, most treatments have
emphasized the potential perverse incentives involved. For example,
scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that discounted or
subsidized insurance can “have a negative impact” on ecosystem
services by distorting the true cost of planning or development in
certain areas.159
B. Types of Insurance
There are two dominant types of insurance contracts: indemnity
based and parametric.160 Indemnity-based policies guarantee payment
in an amount equal to the actual losses sustained.161 This requires a loss
adjuster to visit the property following a damaging event to confirm the
loss and the amount that is covered under the policy. Indemnity
insurance requires some understanding and modeling of the exact
exposure and risk management actions of the insured to establish
accurate pricing, since any payout is based on the actual losses
sustained.

among other possible measures. However, there has been no evaluation of their efficacy in
providing incentives for new mitigation investments. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
STANDARDS AND FINANCE TO SUPPORT COMMUNITY RESILIENCE 8–10 (2016) (surveying
incentives given by different states to encourage citizens to install environmental safety measures
on their homes).
159. See, e.g., Chad J. McGuire, Valuing Ecosystem Services in Coastal Management Policy:
Looking Beyond the Here and Now, 30 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 42, 45 (2015) (“[S]ubsidies can
often lead to price distortions that influence valuations.”).
160. Since the late 1990s, a market for insurance-linked securities, which transfer risk to the
financial markets, has developed. These are risk-transfer tools that can be used by companies and
governments as a substitute or complement to standard insurance. Catastrophe bonds are a
common example. They have not yet been used in the context of insuring ecosystems, although
they could be used in a similar fashion to the insurance policies discussed in this Part. For general
discussions about how catastrophe bonds work, see generally Todd V. McMillan, Securitization
and the Catastrophe Bond: A Transactional Integration of Industries Through a CapacityEnhancing Product of Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131 (2002) (discussing how
catastrophe bonds integrate the insurance and financial industries) and Daniel Schwarcz & Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1606–08 (2014)
(discussing insurance-linked securities including catastrophe bonds).
161. See ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY 13 (2d ed. 2005) (“Under the principle of indemnity, insureds should not profit from a
covered loss but should be restored to no better than their financial position prior to the loss.”).
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In contrast, parametric policies pay the insured when a certain
predefined “triggering event” occurs, regardless of the insured’s level
of loss.162 Triggers tend to be objective measures of disaster occurrence,
such as wind speed in a particular location or water height on a flood
gauge. To avoid possible manipulation of the trigger, most parametric
policies are triggered by data sourced from independent third parties,
such as governmental agencies.163 The benefit of a parametric policy
over an indemnity-based policy is that payout can be extremely rapid
since there is no need for adjusters to validate a specific level of loss.
The absence of adjusters can also make parametric policies less
expensive.
The primary downside of parametric insurance is what is known
as “basis risk.” This is simply the risk that the payout will not match
actual damages sustained. Basis risk can be minimized, however,
through careful attention to trigger design—that is, by choosing a
trigger that is highly correlated with the insured’s potential losses.164
C. Private and Public Insurance
Thus far, this Article has largely focused on the private insurance
market. But private insurance has its limits. For example, there are
some risks—namely those that violate some of the criteria for
insurability165—that private commercial insurance firms find
challenging to take on, making it less likely that private markets will
supply coverage for these risks at all. In particular, natural disasters
and other catastrophes can have very extreme loss years as discussed

162. For a broader discussion of parametric insurance, see generally CLYDE & CO,
PARAMETRIC INSURANCE: CLOSING THE PROTECTION GAP (2018), https://www.clydeco.com/
resilience/download [https://perma.cc/XNG5-BSGA].
163. Neil A. Doherty & Andreas Richter, Moral Hazard, Basis Risk, and Gap Insurance, 69
J. RISK & INS. 9, 13 (2002). On moral hazards associated with trigger-type policies, see generally
Tobias Götze & Marc Gürtler, Risk Transfer and Moral Hazard: An Examination on the Market
for Insurance-Linked Securities (Working Paper, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262669
[https://perma.cc/D6QF-ZTDN].
164. See J. David Cummins, David Lalonde & Richard D. Phillips, The Basis Risk of
Catastrophic-Loss Index Securities, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 77, 80–81 (2004) (studying the hedging
efficacy of insurance contracts for Florida insurers). There is also increasing interest in minimizing
basis risk for microinsurance—which tends to be parametric—in a developing world context. See,
e.g., Ghada Elabed, Marc F. Bellemare, Michael R. Carter & Catherine Guirkinger, Managing
Basis Risk with Multiscale Index Insurance, 44 AGRIC. ECON. 419, 428–29 (2013) (describing the
findings of an index insurance pilot project launched in Mali that was designed to pay out for
particular triggers and concluding that “to be effective, index insurance contracts must be found
that reduce levels of basis risk”).
165. See supra Part II.A.
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above. When a severe loss year occurs, it can threaten private insurer
solvency. This makes risk transfer more challenging, because insurers
must have access to sufficient capital to remain solvent after an event
in order to meet regulatory and rating-agency requirements.166 Holding
or renting such capital can be expensive.167 The premiums associated
with catastrophic risk insurance, therefore, can exceed the consumer’s
ability or willingness to pay.168 Further, disasters can create a negative
capital shock to the insurance industry, leading to hard markets where
supply is scarce and coverage costly.169
Such challenges have led to myriad government interventions in
disaster insurance markets across the globe.170 Many of these
interventions established insurance programs after disaster events
exposed either a lack of available private insurance or raised concerns
about its cost. But while their origins may be similar, the forms these
programs have taken are not. At times the government acts as the
insurer and at other times as a reinsurer. Some programs are purely
public, while others are quasi-public or designed as a public-private
partnership. Examples in the United States include the National Flood
Insurance Program (“NFIP”),171 the California Earthquake

166. John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 101,
110–27 (2010) (discussing the role of credit rating agencies in shaping state insurance regulation);
Daniel Schwarcz, The Risks of Shadow Insurance, 50 GA. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2015) (discussing
regulatory capital requirements for insurers as protecting policyholders).
167. See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 154, at 208 (discussing the financial difficulties with
capital in catastrophe insurance).
168. Carolyn Kousky & Roger Cooke, Explaining the Failure to Insure Catastrophic Risks, 37
GENEVA PAPERS 206, 207 (2012).
169. Carolyn Kousky, Revised Risk Assessments and the Insurance Industry, in POLICY
SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
AND FINANCIAL CRISES 58, 62–64 (Edward J. Balleisen et al. eds., 2017).
170. Several reports have surveyed these interventions around the world. See, e.g., PAULA
JARZABKOWSKI, KONSTANTINOS CHALKIAS, EUGENIA CACCIATORI & REBECCA BEDNAREK,
BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET: PROTECTION GAP ENTITIES AND CATASTROPHIC RISK 3
(2018); Youbaraj Paudel, A Comparative Study of Public–Private Catastrophe Insurance Systems:
Lessons from Current Practices, 37 GENEVA PAPERS 257, 262–78 (2012).
171. Carolyn Kousky, Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood Insurance
Program, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 11, 11 (2018).
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Authority,172 state wind pools such as Florida Citizens,173 and the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program.174
These quasi- to fully governmental insurance programs differ in
some fundamental respects from their private counterparts. First,
many can combine risk transfer with other regulations or incentives for
risk reduction. For example, to participate in the NFIP, communities
must first adopt minimum floodplain-management regulations.175 A
private insurer could not require such regulations as a precondition,
although they could use risk reduction in their underwriting, and
choose not to offer policies in areas that do not meet certain criteria.
Second, pricing and underwriting in the programs are often driven by
broader political concerns, rather than just profitability.176 For
example, the NFIP must offer a policy to anyone in a participating
community and Congress has repeatedly intervened in pricing for
political purposes.177 Finally, public insurance programs often have
different financial structures than a private program or policy. For
example, many state wind pools rely on bond issuances and ex post
assessments on policyholders and insurers to finance losses—
something a private insurer cannot do.178
III. INSURING ECOSYSTEMS
This Part identifies and describes the two primary ways that
insurance could contribute to ecosystem conservation and restoration:
(1) insuring ecosystems directly and (2) providing incentives through
insurance for the provision of certain ecosystem services. While these
approaches are not a silver bullet, they may be an effective

172. Daniel Marshall, An Overview of the California Earthquake Authority, 21 RISK MGMT.
& INS. REV. 73, 74–75 (2018).
173. Lorilee A. Medders & Jack E. Nicholson, Evaluating the Public Financing for Florida’s
Wind Risk, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 117, 117–18 (2018).
174. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Howard Kunreuther, A Successful (Yet Somewhat Untested)
Case of Disaster Financing: Terrorism Insurance Under TRIA, 2002–2020, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS.
REV. 157, 158 (2018).
175. See Floodplain Management Ordinances, FEMA (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:47 AM),
https://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management-ordinances [https://perma.cc/B84F-TZJR].
176. Lorilee A. Medders, Charles M. Nyce & J. Bradley Karl, Market Implications of Public
Policy Interventions: The Case of Florida’s Property Insurance Market, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS.
REV. 183, 186 (2013).
177. Carolyn Kousky, Brett Lingle & Leonard Shabman, The Pricing of Flood Insurance, 4 J.
EXTREME EVENTS 1750001-1, 1750001-4 (2017).
178. ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY PLANS:
FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 21 (2014).
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complement to existing forms of governance. This Part then delves into
the specifics of the extant attempts—in practice and in theory—to use
insurance to help protect or restore ecosystem services. Although
interest in insurance-based approaches is growing, the number of onthe-ground examples is quite limited.
A. Insuring Nature Itself
A novel approach to insurance comes from recognizing that
ecosystems could be protected and restored by insuring the ecosystems
themselves. In essence, spatially delineated natural areas could be
insured against possible damage or degradation just like real property.
The first challenge with this approach is finding an entity with an
insurable interest that is willing and able to pay the premium. An
insurable interest is simply a stake in the value of the insured item. If
an entity would not suffer a financial loss, there is no insurable interest,
and the entity cannot legally purchase an insurance policy.179 This
suggests it may not be possible for an environmental nongovernmental
organization to insure damage to Yellowstone National Park, for
example, assuming that it would not suffer a financial loss if the park
was damaged. The National Park Service, on the other hand, would
have an insurable interest and could purchase such a policy.
If an entity with an insurable interest is identified, this entity then
must also be willing and able to pay the necessary insurance
premiums.180 For many ecosystems, their benefits are public goods,
which might provide disincentives to those with an insurable interest
to pay. Even those entities that would be financially affected by
ecosystem degradation might be unwilling to shoulder the cost of the
premium alone, when benefits accrue to many others. That is, as with
the property insurance incentives discussed in Part III.B, ecosystem
insurance could suffer the same free-riding problems afflicting
attempts at providing many public goods. Fortunately, there are
multiple examples of coordinating mechanisms and institutions that
can help overcome this free-rider problem that could be used in this
context as well. The Mexican Coastal Zone Management Trust we
discuss below is an example of such an institution that can collect

179. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE art. 4, § 281 (2018) (defining “insurable interest” as “[e]very
interest in property, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof, of such a nature that a
contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured” (emphasis omitted)).
180. Id.
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contributions from multiple beneficiaries and coordinate a collective
response.181
Even if an entity has an insurable interest and available funds, it
still must believe that an insurance product is preferable to other
approaches and worth the cost. This first requires that there are indeed
restoration efforts that can be undertaken post-disaster to help the
system recover. Further, to justify paying insurance premiums, this
restoration should require large sums of money, unlikely to be
immediately available without claims payouts. For instance,
reforestation after a wildfire requires many person-hours of growing
and planting seedlings, making it expensive. But planting native grasses
and shrubs post-fire can help stabilize the soil and prevent further
damage from mudslides and erosion,182 if undertaken quickly. If no
other funding for this restoration is otherwise available, a wildfire
insurance policy may be an attractive option.
The type of insurance contract will also determine the feasibility
of this approach. Indemnity-based policies may likely be difficult for
insuring nature directly. As discussed above, an indemnity policy
would compensate for the actual damage to an ecosystem or to natural
capital. Estimating this damage could require costly and timeconsuming nonmarket valuation studies post-disaster. This would drive
up the transaction costs of the insurance and slow payouts
considerably. As such, a parametric insurance policy, in which the
payout is based on objective measures of the disaster, is likely
preferable.
Finally, the insurance policy must be cost-effective and add value
beyond what the entity with an insured interest could do on its own.
Instead of purchasing insurance from a third party, entities could
choose to self-insure by setting aside their own funds to use postdisaster, or they could use debt to finance any needed restoration. It
may not always be financially optimal to purchase insurance for
restoration; financial analyses would need to be undertaken on a caseby-case basis.
181. See infra Part III.C.
182. On the effectiveness of measures to reduce erosion after wildfire, see Peter R. Robichaud
& William J. Elliot, Protection from Erosion Following Wildfire 2–6 (July 9–12, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/pubs/24606 [https://perma.cc/
VWZ4-Z7QX]; see also J. W. Wagenbrenner, L. H. MacDonald & D. Rough, Effectiveness of
Three Post-Fire Rehabilitation Treatments in the Colorado Front Range, 20 HYDROLOGICAL
PROCESSES 2989, 3002–04 (2006) (discussing the efficacy of methods to decrease erosion in
Colorado).
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B. Financial Incentives for Ecosystem Protection or Restoration
Standard property insurance policies paired with financial
incentives through premiums are a second avenue to address risks to
ecosystem services. If natural ecosystems provide protection to insured
property—such as green infrastructure mitigating stormwater flooding,
for instance—insurers could charge property owners a lower premium
than would be feasible in the absence of that protection. The insurer
USAA, for example, provides discounts to policyholders residing in
communities that participate in the Firewise program.183 Firewise is a
community-level program run by the National Fire Protection
Association, a nonprofit focused on reducing fire losses. Participants
undertake a range of preparedness activities, including landscaping, to
reduce fire risk on their properties. At least theoretically, such an
approach is not limited to just property insurance. Liability insurance
policies could also be priced to reflect more careful ecosystem
management, although no specific examples of this practice are known.
While it is appealing to lower the cost of property insurance to
reflect protection from natural capital, there are two substantial
challenges with this practice. The first is that insurers must be very
confident about the risk-reduction benefits before they can offer a
premium reduction. Quantifying an ecosystem’s protective benefits is
still a relatively new endeavor; while protection may be established at
broad levels, it may be difficult to reach a level of precision that could
inform actual pricing.184
To be clear, confidence in risk-reduction benefits is not the same
thing as economic valuation. Insurers do not need exact estimates of
the ecosystem service’s total monetary value but rather require an
assessment of the service’s impact on risk levels. That is, they need to
know how changes in the extent of natural infrastructure impact
expected losses for an insured property for various magnitude
events.185 For example, while an insurer might know that coastal
mangroves generally act as a storm surge buffer,186 they may find it

183. See Insurance Discounts for USAA Members in Seven States, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N,
https://www.nfpa.org/Public-Education/By-topic/Wildfire/Firewise-USA/Become-a-FirewiseUSA-site/Program-benefits/Insurance-discounts-for-USAA-members-in-seven-states
[https://perma.cc/L45S-2CF9].
184. This conclusion is based on informal interviews with multiple representatives of global
reinsurance and brokerage firms.
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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difficult to assess how planting a new acre of mangroves alters the price
of hurricane insurance for specific insured properties behind those
mangroves.
The second challenge is a mismatch in scale. While ecosystems are
often local or even regional public goods that provide risk-reduction
services to many properties simultaneously, property insurance is
typically purchased at the level of the individual household or firm. The
premium reduction for any one property may not be sufficient to cover
the costs of providing the ecosystem service as a whole. As a result,
some type of institutional arrangement is necessary to overcome free
riding and encourage all insured property owners to participate in
funding the conservation or restoration of their shared service, such as
a trust.187 In other words, insurance still must overcome the public
goods provision problem.
As with some other public goods, governments could choose to
pay for the provision of the ecosystem service. Governmental entities
may be motivated to invest more in conservation and restoration when
their residents see premium reductions in response to risk-reducing
investments. An example comes from the NFIP’s Community Rating
System,188 a program that rewards communities that adopt flood risk
reduction measures with reductions on flood insurance premiums for
residents. These reductions, however, do not necessarily reflect lower
overall payments. Instead, premiums are lowered by cross-subsidizing
other policyholders in a public effort to promote better flood risk
management.189 They may, however, partially contribute to increased
local government interest in adopting such measures.190 The extent to
which residents benefiting from lower premiums encourages local
governments to invest in risk reduction, however, is unknown. For
example, it is unclear whether the premium reductions homeowners
receive on their policies in Firewise communities provide incentives for
local governments to invest further in wildfire mitigation.
187. See infra Part III.C.
188. For more on the program see FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET:
RATING
SYSTEM
(June
2017),
https://www.fema.gov/media-libraryCOMMUNITY
data/1507029324530-082938e6607d4d9eba4004890dbad39c/NFIP_CRS_Fact_Sheet_2017_
508OK.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MQA-B272].
189. See supra note 177.
190. A case study of Avalon, New Jersey, notes lower flood insurance premiums as being at
least a part of the discussions over investments in dune protection. See Karl F. Nordstrom, Nancy
L. Jackson, Michael Bruno & Harry A. de Butts, Municipal Initiatives for Managing Dunes in
Coastal Residential Areas: A Case Study of Avalon, New Jersey, USA, 47 GEOMORPHOLOGY 137,
143 (2002).
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C. Innovations in Insuring Ecosystems Globally
Having offered some general lessons about the types of insurance
that may help guarantee provision of ecosystem services, this Section
describes the few examples of such policies in practice or in
development. These examples are worth understanding because they
are the first attempts to innovate in insurance markets for ecosystem
services and, as such, the lessons gleaned from these examples will be
critical in helping other communities and governments follow in their
footsteps.
1. Mexican Coastal Zone Management Trust. In 2018, The
Nature Conservancy (“TNC”) signed an agreement with the Quintana
Roo State Government in Mexico and the Cancún and Puerto Morelos
Hotel Owners Association to develop a Coastal Zone Management
Trust to build resilience along the coastline of the Yucatan peninsula.191
The project was initiated following two hurricanes that caused
approximately $8 billion in damages and shuttered many local hotels
and businesses.192 Research revealed that the hotels and beaches near
Puerto Morelos—which is protected by a coral reef system—sustained
less harm than neighboring, unprotected areas.193 Thus, the stated goal
of the project is for the Trust to “finance ongoing maintenance of reefs
and beaches and purchase insurance to ensure these vital ecosystems
are restored after extreme storms hit.”194 To that end, the tourism
industry will collect and provide taxes to fund “maintenance and
restoration efforts for 60 kilometers of reef and beaches” and will fund
the purchase of a parametric insurance policy.195
The concept for the parametric policy was developed in
partnership with Swiss Re, a global reinsurance firm,196 and is a form of
parametric insurance. As noted above, parametric insurance pays out
when a specified, verifiable event occurs. In this case, when wind
speeds exceed certain thresholds, policy payouts are triggered—at
higher wind speeds, a larger payment is given.197 Parametric insurance
191. Insuring Nature to Ensure a Resilient Future, supra note 22; Tercek, supra note 22.
192. Insuring Nature to Ensure a Resilient Future, supra note 22.
193. Id. (“[A] healthy coral reef can reduce up to 97 percent of a wave’s energy before it hits
the shore . . . .”).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Gonzalez, supra note 23.
197. Id.; Tercek, supra note 22 (noting that 110 knots represents the wind speed of a Category
4 hurricane).
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obviates the need for assessors to come out to assess damage, does not
require economic valuation of the damage, and eliminates any ensuing
disputes that might occur over the extent of the damage. Instead, the
aim is to provide funds to restore the reef and beaches quickly.198 The
Trust purchased the insurance policy in June 2019 from a Mexicobased insurer, Afirme Seguros Grupo Financiero SA de CV, with a
coverage limit of $3.8 million.199 If a storm occurs that damages the reef
but the policy-triggering wind speed is not reached, the Trust can
operate as a form of self-insurance.200
Although parametric insurance has been used for many years, this
policy is innovative in that a group of beneficiaries of a public good
collaborated to insure an ecosystem that they do not own. The policy
should be scalable to other locations, as researchers have determined
that coral reefs generate $36 billion globally in tourism.201 Indeed, in
September 2019, TNC indicated that it is actively working to expand
this concept to Florida and Hawaii, and that the organization received
a $1 million grant from Bank of America to fund research to locate
areas in these two states where such programs could be effectively
implemented.202
2. Global Ecosystem Resilience Facility. In March 2018, at the
Economist’s World Ocean Summit, Willis Towers Watson, a Londonbased risk-management, insurance, and reinsurance brokerage firm,
announced the creation of its Global Ecosystem Resilience Facility
(“GERF”). The GERF aims to build management frameworks and use
innovative financing to increase the resilience of both ecosystems and
the communities that depend on them.203 In its initial phase, the GERF
198. Insuring Nature to Ensure a Resilient Future, supra note 22.
199. Gonzalez, supra note 23.
200. Insuring Nature to Ensure a Resilient Future, supra note 22.
201. Mark Spalding et al., Mapping the Global Value and Distribution of Coral Reef Tourism,
82 MARINE POL’Y 104, 109 (2017) (including both on-reef activities like snorkeling and off-reef
activities like beach enjoyment that is enhanced by the presence of coral reefs).
202. $1 Million Grant from Bank of America Helps The Nature Conservancy Explore Scaling
a Coral Reef Insurance Product in Florida and Hawaii, BANK OF AMERICA (Sept. 24, 2019, 11:00
AM),
https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/print/pdf/node/9579
[https://perma.cc/TAW65ABF]; Claire Wilkinson, The Nature Conservancy Looks to Reef Policy for US Coastal Areas,
INS.
(Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190925/
BUS.
NEWS06/912330842/The-Nature-Conservancy-looks-to-reef-policy-for-US-coastal-areas
[https://perma.cc/2QZT-FF4N].
203. Services, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/services
[https://perma.cc/L69Y-CT69]; Willis Towers Watson Launches the Global Ecosystem Resilience
Facility, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:00 AM) [hereinafter Willis Towers Watson
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focuses on “the protection of ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves
and seagrasses . . . to support resilience of fishing communities at threat
from hurricanes and coral decline.”204 The goal is to provide incentives
for better ecosystem stewardship through risk finance tools. In
particular, by assisting with project finance, the GERF can “help
regions bridge the post-disaster funding gap” if natural disasters affect
these ecosystem services.205 In addition, the GERF aims to provide
programs that enable the “coordination and pre-planning of swift postevent recovery”206 and supply analytical and technical support.
Although the facility is brand new, Willis Towers Watson sees the
potential for risk-transfer approaches and analytics to support
ecosystem protection and restoration.
3. Other Potential Uses of Insurance. Outside the ocean
ecosystem context, other policymakers are exploring the ways in which
innovative insurance tools could address ecosystems threatened by
wildfire or earthquake risks. With wildfire, insurance has traditionally
been used to cover the value of timber lost during disaster events.207
However, policies that cover the costs of replanting these forests are
feasible, but less common. One study has estimated that only slightly
more than 1 percent of forests in Spain, for example, are insured for
replanting costs after a wildfire, despite high wildfire risk in many
places throughout the country.208 At least some theoretical policy
design research has explored the benefits of an insurance-funded
replanting scheme from the timber manager’s perspective, but it is not
common on the ground.209

Launches],
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/03/09/1419744/0/en/WillisTowers-Watson-launches-the-Global-Ecosystem-Resilience-Facility.html
[https://perma.cc/FVM9-PDET].
204. Willis Towers Watson Launches, supra note 203.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. While available, many landowners may not purchase this insurance, perhaps because
they do not believe the value to be worth the expense. See generally Yiling Deng, Ian A. Munn,
Keith Coble & Haibo Yao, Willingness to Pay for Potential Standing Timber Insurance, 47 J.
AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 510 (2015).
208. ROMAN MARCO HOHL, AGRICULTURAL RISK TRANSFER: FROM INSURANCE TO
REINSURANCE TO CAPITAL MARKETS 341 (2019).
209. See Jesús Barreal, Maria L. Loureiro & Juan Picos, On Insurance as a Tool for Securing
Forest Restoration After Wildfires, 42 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 15, 16–18 (2014). Also, for a
broader discussion of forestry insurance and the possibility of insuring carbon sequestration
credits, see generally BRUCE MANLEY & RICHARD WATT, FORESTRY INSURANCE, RISK
POOLING, AND RISK MINIMISATION OPTIONS (2009).
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Similar policies could also be taken out for publicly managed
forests that are not harvested for timber, but protected for the other
ecosystem services they provide. In the United States, such insurance
is not common, but there are public programs to assist with replanting.
For example, the national Tree Assistance Program provides payouts
to qualifying orchardists or nursery tree growers to replant or
rehabilitate trees damaged by natural disasters.210 These programs may
crowd out private insurance. In other words, if robust free or low-cost
public insurance programs exist, there would be no need to purchase
an insurance policy on private markets.
A similar approach might be possible to provide funding to fill in
land that has rifts, breaks, or other damage after an earthquake.
Currently, the California Earthquake Authority’s insurance policies do
not cover landscaping or land damage, such as from sinkholes, land
fissures, or erosion.211 Such coverage may be privately available for a
high premium from select private firms. In contrast, New Zealand
provides a public earthquake insurance program with more coverage
for land, although it primarily supports land restoration near homes or
accessways.212 New Zealand’s program did not explicitly cover
restoration of damage from liquefaction and soil thinning—as occurred
in the 2010 Canterbury earthquakes—leading to ongoing policy
discussions about whether to redefine the scope of the program.213
Finally, some scholars have recently called for more research to
examine how insurance could be used to shield municipalities from
liability if green infrastructure investments fail to perform as
designed.214 This would be a slightly different approach than the two
210. For more information, see Farm Serv. Agency, Tree Assistance Program (TAP), U.S.
OF
AGRIC.,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/disaster-assistanceDEP’T
program/tree-assistance-program/index [https://perma.cc/Q3XD-2K3A].
211. The policy terms are available at Earthquake Insurance, CAL. DEP’T INS.,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/105-type/95-guides/03-res/eq-ins.cfm
[https://perma.cc/9ZLH-28XJ].
212. More information is available at What We Do: Land, EQC EARTHQUAKE COMMISSION
NEW
ZEALAND
(May
20,
2019),
https://www.eqc.govt.nz/what-we-do/land
[https://perma.cc/LJ2H-BF3C].
213. Hugh Cowan, Bryan Dunne & Anna Griffiths, Planning for Loss or Complexity? New
Zealand’s Earthquake Commission: The Story So Far, 5 CONSORSEGUROS 1, 13–15 (Oct. 2016)
(describing the lessons learned in the wake of the Canterbury earthquake disaster).
214. See, e.g., James Salzman et al., The Most Important Current Research Questions in Urban
Ecosystem Services, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 38 (2014) (“[C]an insurance protect against
the risk of failure or noncompliance of a green-infrastructure project that depends on coordinated
activities by multiple public and private parties to maintain their components of the ecosystem
services project?”).
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methods discussed above, where the focus is on how insurance can help
incentivize the protection or restoration of natural systems.
D. The Necessary Conditions for Insurance
The above analysis demonstrates that, under certain conditions,
pairing incentives for ecosystem protection with property insurance or
insuring nature itself can both be effective tools for conserving and
restoring ecosystems. This final Section summarizes the necessary
conditions for these approaches.
In sum, because both methods require that some very specific
conditions be met, it is unlikely that insurance will become a panacea
for ecosystem service provision. Yet when those conditions are met,
insurance can be a powerful governance tool, because it fills a niche
that other approaches cannot. Thus, to return to the primary question
motivating this Article, we contend that insurance can play an
important role in ecosystem management but that this role is narrow.
We begin with the conditions for the more innovative approach of
insuring nature itself and then discuss using property insurance to
provide incentives for ecosystem protection. To insure nature itself,
there must first be a party or parties with an interest in purchasing
insurance. This could be a private landholder, a set of private
landholders, a government entity or entities, or some combination of
the three. Stimulating these parties’ interest, however, may require
studies demonstrating the economic value of ecosystem services
provided directly to certain stakeholders by natural systems.
Second, and relatedly, these interested parties must be willing and
able to pay the premium associated with an insurance policy. In some
cases, private property owners may be incentivized to pay such
premiums on their own; for example, landowners living in a fire-prone
area might pay insurance premiums so that they can restore their forest
after a wildfire. However, many ecosystems are not privately owned,
and in those that are, private owners usually derive only a small portion
of the benefits from an ecosystem on their property. Therefore, some
form of government or multistakeholder participation may be required
to drive the creation of collaborative institutional mechanisms.
Third, the target ecosystem must be threatened with damage or
degradation by a random peril, such as a hurricane, storm surge,
wildfire, or high winds. If instead the ecosystem is threatened by a
known, certain peril, such as a slow rise in temperature or an increase
in ocean acidification, the ecosystem likely does not meet basic criteria
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for insurability.215 Insurers will only insure against random risks, not
certainties. Therefore, while insurance may not be an appropriate
mechanism for protecting ecosystems from the gradual effects of
climate change, it can be employed to combat its more stochastic
effects, such as hurricanes, flooding, or storm surge.
Fourth, the ecosystem must be able to be restored by actions that
can be funded by an immediate infusion of post-disaster cash. If an
ecosystem is incapable of being repaired once damaged, then insuring
the ecosystem provides no benefit. But if an ecosystem is capable of
being restored, such as a forest after a wildfire, or a coral reef after a
hurricane, or a beach after an oil spill, then ecosystem insurance has a
role to play that goes beyond existing governance tools. Timing is also
critical for determining whether insurance is the right tool. If a slower
time frame for restoration is acceptable, then it may be possible for an
ex post financing scheme—even if significantly delayed—to fill this
gap. For instance, if a local government could issue bonds to pay for
restoration, it may not need to purchase insurance. In such a situation,
the extra transaction costs associated with an insurance policy make it
less appealing. When time is of the essence, however, insurance is often
preferable.
Finally, insurance must be cost-effective as compared to other
mechanisms. For example, if the cost of restoration is very low, it may
be more financially sound simply to self-insure. The Mexican Coastal
Zone Management Trust provides a fine illustration: in that case, when
wind speeds do not exceed the insurance policy’s pay-out threshold,
the Trust itself acts as a self-insurance mechanism. Self-insurance aside,
insuring nature must also be cheaper than other available financial
mechanisms, such as bonding. But when post-disaster funds are not
likely to come cheaply, readily, or quickly using such mechanisms,
insurance becomes more attractive.
We turn now to the approach of using standard property insurance
to create incentives for protecting natural systems. Some of these
necessary conditions overlap with the approach of insuring nature
directly, while others differ. First, there must be insured property
benefiting from or having the potential to benefit from an ecosystem
service. Second, there must be some institutional mechanism to
aggregate contributions from many property owners and prevent free
215. One caveat is that if the timing of impacts was indeed random, the losses may still be
insurable. For instance, if ocean acidification could occur at any random time over the next several
decades, there may be a private entity willing to insure the risk.
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riding, because the financial incentive provided by one insurance policy
alone is unlikely to be sufficient to cover the costs of conservation or
restoration. Finally, insurer understanding of ecosystem service
modeling must be advanced enough to inform pricing or underwriting
decisions by an insurance company. This modeling can be challenging,
and often our understanding of the protective services from ecosystems
is not yet sufficiently advanced to offer such premium reductions.
IV. THE VALUE AND VALUES OF INSURANCE
At a basic level, any selected tool of environmental governance
must be able to achieve its goals and be cost-effective.216 If the
government must play a role, the tool must also be politically
feasible.217 Part III analyzes the conditions under which ecosystembased insurance policies can achieve their goals and describes when
this approach is preferable to or complementary to other forms of
environmental governance.
But once we know that insurance can “do the job,” a second
question arises: Is insurance worthwhile? In other words, what value or
values does insurance promote that other governance tools do not?
Specifically, how does insurance further or hinder important values
like legitimacy, accountability and transparency, potential for
transnational impacts, environmental or distributive justice, and
expressive content, compared to other approaches?218 This final Part of
the Article takes up these normative questions.
With respect to accountability and transparency, insuring
ecosystems fares exceptionally well. In contrast to other governance
options such as self-insurance or relying on the government to provide
ex post disaster relief and restoration funds, insurance is far more
transparent and provides greater accountability. Because a policy can
be purchased in advance for a known payout when a determinate
triggering event occurs, all parties know the stakes ahead of time.
Further, because a third-party insurance firm guarantees the payments,
delivery of what was bargained for is assured. This avoids the pitfalls
of an all-too-familiar scenario in which a government promises disaster
relief or restoration funds in the abstract but does not deliver, or
provides funds only according to some unknown, ex post criteria. It
216. Light & Orts, supra note 25, at 56 (listing multiple criteria, including efficiency and
effectiveness, against which to weigh public or private environmental governance tools).
217. Id. (discussing political feasibility).
218. Id. (listing multiple normative criteria beyond effectiveness and efficiency).
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also avoids the possibility that loans or other forms of bonding or debt
are not forthcoming.
Insurance also has significant potential for positive transnational
impacts219 that certain domestic governance regimes like the ESA or
the CWA § 404 permit program cannot reach.220 If, for example, a coral
reef straddled a geographic or national boundary, an insurance policy
could be developed on a global or multinational scale to include private
parties and government actors on both sides of the boundary. There is
no clear geographic limit to who can participate in the creation of a
multiparty trust fund to purchase insurance, or who could be insured
under a single parametric policy. This is a significant advantage over
certain other forms of ecosystem governance.
With respect to distributive justice, the impact of ecosystem
insurance is more of a mixed bag. On the one hand, insurance that
promotes ecosystem restoration can have positive impacts on
distributive or environmental justice. Unlike the situation in which a
private landowner chooses to insure her forest against the risk of fire
solely for the value of the timber which benefits her alone, ecosystem
insurance can accommodate broader goals to restore those services
that may benefit the public at large. As noted above, ecosystems tend
to be public goods and no one can easily be excluded from the benefits
of their conservation and restoration. And studies have therefore
shown that ecosystems protect vulnerable populations along the
coastline, including both impoverished communities and the elderly, as
well as the more affluent.221
On the other hand, however, the necessary conditions for the
creation and purchase of ecosystem insurance may only exist when the
ecosystem protects a valuable asset that someone with means wants to
safeguard. If the asset being protected is not sufficiently valuable (for
example, an impoverished community rather than upscale tourist
hotels), there may be less impetus for the relevant stakeholders to
create a mechanism to pay insurance premiums. Focusing solely on the
property values that would be protected by such ecosystem services
could lead to concerns about environmental justice—namely, that

219. Id. (discussing transnational impacts).
220. In contrast to these wholly domestic programs, PES programs can have significant
transnational impacts. For example, the Costa Rican PES program designed to encourage private
landowners to conserve ecosystems that sequester carbon and protect biodiversity has a global
impact. See sources cited supra notes 126–28.
221. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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policymakers ignore the importance of ecosystem services to
populations with low property values.222 In such cases, ecosystem
insurance might still be useful; however, it may be more important to
involve governments in such cases to ensure that such communities
have access to the immediate restoration funds they need.
The expressive content of ecosystem insurance is also complex and
multifaceted. On the one hand, the idea of insuring nature itself
appears to express respect for nature in a way that standard privateproperty indemnity insurance does not.223 Indeed, rather than a private
entity purchasing insurance for the loss or damage to private property,
nature itself is the focus of the policy. At the very least, this expresses
that nature is of value, just as private property is. However, although
nature may be the subject of the insurance policy, such policies are
ultimately designed to protect ecosystem services that themselves
protect people and benefit society. In fact, the very notion of ecosystem
services or natural capital—rather than “nature”—is consistent with
the underlying anthropocentrism of other forms of environmental
governance in this context.224
This need not be so, however. Although initial efforts to insure
nature in the ways described here focus on the services that ecosystems
provide to society, it is possible to take a more expansive view and
enshrine a more nature-centered view of governance.225 While a full
treatment of such efforts is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
pausing to suggest that insuring nature itself—not just ecosystems and
the services they provide—deserves a closer look in the environmental
law and policy literature.

222. Arkema et al., supra note 7, at 916 (noting this concern and providing evidence that
coastal ecosystems “protect more poor families relative to the total population in Texas and more
elderly and total property value in Florida” (citations omitted)).
223. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 427, 741–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Contemporary
public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.”); Gordon, supra note 1,
at 87 (arguing that the issue of environmental personhood is not a binary question, but rather one
that has different shades of meaning because it is “real, constructed, and lodged in discursive
space”); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 452 (1972) (arguing that natural objects should have standing to
sue on their own behalf).
224. Gordon, supra note 1, at 74 (surveying literature on whether the environment has
standing, and concluding that a “human-centered way of approaching environmental problems
distorts even the best-intentioned environmentalism”).
225. It is likely that government entities and nonprofit organizations would need to play a
larger role in the creation of such instruments than private parties.
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Insurance can also create positive spillover effects for other tools
of governance. For example, insurers must perform sophisticated
modeling and risk quantification before issuing policies. These models
and risk quantifications, if shared with the public or other groups
working on ecosystem services, could guide investments in
conservation even in the absence of ecosystem insurance. Similarly,
just as advocates of PES contend that market-based approaches
generate valuations that can, in turn, inform other governance
approaches to ecosystem services, so, too, can insurance generate such
information.
Although ecosystem insurance fares well along these different
normative criteria, it is not without its flaws. As an initial matter, any
regime employing a parametric policy introduces basis risk—the risk
that the payout does not match the extent of damage or the cost of
restoration.226 Thus, there is a risk that a disaster is so extreme and
catastrophic that the insurance payout does not provide sufficient
funds to restore the ecosystem. Indeed, basis risk is one reason why
individual homeowners are unlikely to opt for parametric insurance
over indemnity insurance, as any discrepancy between the funds
needed to repair one’s home and the actual loss or damage can be
devastating. Of course, sophisticated buyers can work to design a
policy trigger that is highly correlated with needed funds and thus
minimize concerns about basis risk in the ecosystem-insurance context.
But the risk remains, nonetheless.
Finally, it is important to remember that, at base, insurance is just
a mechanism to transfer risk; it is not a source of funding. As such, it is
not a silver bullet for generating more funds for ecosystem
conservation and restoration than might otherwise be available. In
other words, someone must pay annual premiums in order to have
post-disaster payouts. And in order to provide incentives and
coordination mechanisms for parties with insurable interests to be
willing to pay and participate in such mechanisms, government
participation may well be required.
CONCLUSION
Insurance offers unique attributes that other forms of
environmental governance do not, namely its ability to disperse funds
immediately and to restore ecosystems quickly after a damaging event.

226. See Elabed et al., supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Although parametric insurance is not a panacea for all forms of
damage to ecosystem services, it can play a potentially significant role
in the appropriate circumstances. Insurance is thus an important
complement to existing mechanisms that protect, restore, and make
essential ecosystems more resilient. To the extent ecosystems are
public goods and society is underinvesting in their provision, insurance
alone will not solve that problem. However, wisely designed insurance
programs can mitigate risk and ensure that conservation or restoration
efforts will be implemented quickly in the face of catastrophic or
harmful severe weather events.

